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Abstract
Nowadays, information security in online communication has become an indisputable topic.
People prefer pursuing their connection and public relations due to the greater flexibility and
affordability of online communication. Recently, organizations have established online
networking sites concerned with sharing assets among their employees. As more people engage
in social network, requirements for protecting information and resources becomes vital. Over the
years, many access control methods have been proposed. Although these methods cover various
information security aspects, they have not provided an appropriate approach for securing
information within distributed online networking sites. Moreover, none of the previous research
provides an access control method in case an existing resource encompassing various parts and
each part has its own accessing control policy.
In this research, we investigate the access control requirements in order to conserve data and
encompassed resources, which are shared in the social network, from users with unapproved
access. Under the proposed method, users are able to define policies easily to protect their
individual information and resources from unauthorized users. In addition, requestors are able to
generate inquiries in easy and efficient way. We define an appropriate format to present rules and
queries, which are converted from policies and inquiries respectively. The proposed approach
defines a method in case a user would like to access a resource belonging to another user where
both users are members of different online networking sites. In order to add more flexibility, this
method controls access to data and resources by evaluating requestor’s attributes, object’s
attributes, action or operation taken by requestor, environmental condition, and policies which
are created by users or a super user of social network to protect the users’ resources. This
approach is called Policy-Based Attribute Access Control (PBAAC). The policies defined to
secure a resource may conflict with other policies. The proposed method offers an appropriate

solution to resolve this issue. Due to achievement of better performance with regards to
efficiency, this research analyzes the method to compromise simple rules, complex rules, or rules
including several attributes. The results prove that simple rules provide better performance.
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1. Introduction
As the number of users of information systems have increased significantly in recent years,
the challenge of controlling access to resources has become a hot topic in computer science.
Information security protects data and assets from deleterious users in social networks. Lack of
appropriate control over the data might incur several security issues. According to U.S law [1],
Information security is a process for
“Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure,
disruption, modification, and destruction”.
This means we require a method for protecting our data from malicious users. Furthermore,
in a general sense, security means protecting our resources from unmanaged access. Information
security minimizes the risk of uncovering information of unauthorized users. Information
security is not a technology; instead, it is a strategy comprised of the processes, tools, and
policies to protect digital data and resources. Information security concepts become more
ubiquitous and enmesh in many aspects of computing technology.
Today’s life is mixed with computing technology and using a computer is ubiquitous in
various fields, such as taking an online training course, transferring money, and buying goods
from merchandise, which are an unavoidable part of our life. Although this technology
empowers us to access information easily in a short time, it carries several security issues. On the
other hand, technology changes at an increasingly rapid rate and imposes upon us to define new
security method to keep up with the changes in our technology. In order to find effective
methods to protect our information, good understanding of the basic of information security is a
key point. In our effort to protect our resources, we require contemplating the consequences of
the protection method we choose to implement. Hickey [2] said
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“The only truly secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block in concrete and sealed in
a lead-lines room with armed guards – and even then I have my doubts”.
If we define a method to protect a system and claim that a system might be regarded
reasonably secure, there is no doubt that the system is not functioning very well. As we increase
the level of security, we usually lose the level of performance. Hence, it is critical to maintain a
balance between strict security and high performance of a system.
Three primary properties of information security are confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. These are also known as the CIA triad, as shown as Figure 1, which is a model
designed to define policies for information security within an organization [3].

Figure 1- CIA Triad
•

Confidentiality: this is a required component of privacy and refers to the protection of data
and resources from those who are not allowed to view that data and resources.
Confidentiality defines a set of rules that confine access to data or resources.

•

Integrity: this is a required component for preventing data from being altered in an
unauthorized or unmanaged manner. Integrity associated with maintaining the consistency,
accuracy, and trustworthiness of data during its life cycle [4].
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•

Availability: this is a required component for the ability to access data and resources when
they are needed.

1.1.Access control
Access control is an information security technique that is used to determine who, and under
which constraints, can access or perform an operation against an object in a computing
environment. Access control, which is part of confidentiality, determines what a user will grant
other users to access or perform an operation on a resource or an object mediated by the former
user [5]. The definition provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
describe the access control mechanism, is as follows [1]
“The logical component that serves to receive the access request from the subject, to decide,
and to enforce the access decision “
There are two main types of access control, physical and logical [3]. Under our approach,
only logical access control will be mentioned, which limits connections to computer networks
and accessing data.
Generally, access control manages each user's ability to read, execute, change, or delete
information associated with a particular resource. In effect, access control works in two steps:
first, either grant or deny interaction with a resource, and second, control the types of operations
or activities that may be performed on that resource. Such controls are managed by an access
control system. The access control system may be part of a more general resource management
and control environment [9]. Today, there are numerous methods of access controls implemented
or practiced in real-world settings. These methods are described in the rest of this chapter.
Conventionally, access control is based on the identity of the user requesting to perform an
operation on an object either directly or through predefined roles or groups assigned to the user.
As per Sandhu’s definition [5], authentication, access control, and audit, all together establish
3

information security. Authentication checks the identity of a user wishing to access the
information system. Access activities in the information system analyzes data to find any
security violation [5]. Access controls are applied after authentication which was settled [6].
Audit assists in detection of fraud attempt or actual security cracks by recording details of events
which are relevant to security [8].
In conclusion, access control is a fundamental part of any information security system. The
several main methods of access control systems are: Discretionary Access Control (DAC),
Lattice-based access control or Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC), Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC), and Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC). It
seems that these approaches to access control are cumbersome to govern flexible capabilities
directly associated to users. Furthermore, due to lack of appropriate features to express realworld policies and inquiries users often suffered from semi-dynamic access control methods.
One solution might empower user to define policies and inquiries precisely by using a natural
language and accept or reject user’s inquiry in terms of arbitrary attributes of the user, attributes
of the object, the rules defined by the owner of the object to protect the object, and environment
conditions which are changed based on the time and location and are more relevant to the
policies. This approach will be called Policy-Based Attribute Access Control (PBAAC).
1.2.

Attribute-Based Access Control
For the first time, Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), which was defined by the

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), improves data sharing while data are
supervised [10]. NIST defines ABAC as:
“An access control method where subject requests to perform operations on objects are
granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned attributes of the object,
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environment conditions, and a set of policies that are specified in terms of those attributes and
conditions”. [10]
ABAC is a logical access control model and it checks access to an object based upon the
attributes of entities, operations, and environmental elements pertain to the request. As suggested
by its name, ABAC is an attribute-centric access control where attributes control what resources
a user can access [7]. ABAC can accept a large number of inquiries and evaluate them by using
an access control decision engine. Access control decision engines provide a large set of
combinations of attributes to represent a large set of predefined rules expressing policies which
are confined by the computational language. Under ABAC, access control decision engines may
be shared between inquiries by changing attribute values; there is no need to change the
subject/object relationships defined in rule sets. This feature adds more robust access control
management capabilities and minimizes continuous maintenance requirements of object
preservation. Moreover, ABAC empowers object owners to employ access control policy
without prior knowledge of the particular subject. As a new subject joins the organization, rules
and objects do not require being altered and as long as the subject is assigned attributes required
for access to a specific object, no alteration to existing rules or object attributes are required [6].
This is one of the advantages of applying ABAC method. Although ABAC is a robust access
control method, we need to define a method in order to be able to control an access to objects by
evaluating operations, environmental conditions relevant to a request, and rules which have been
stored in the repository of the user. So, another method would be needed to cooperate with
ABAC to satisfy this requirement. Policy-Based Access Control combines attributes associated
to entities with information of sets of rules that specify whether or not access is allowed.

5

1.3. Policy-Based Access Control
Policy-Based Access Control (PBAC) is an access control method which enables social
networks to govern their resources by defining policies. Social networks define various policies
and administration structures to ensure the successful execution of social network’s mission and
fulfill responsibility and adaptation with relevant law and regulation. Furthermore, they need to
create policies that define who should have access to which resources and under what
circumstances. The PBAC is a method for controlling user access to one or more resources,
while each resource is owned by someone else and is assigned one or more policies to determine
what access is either granted or denied. The PBAC implements actual access controls based on
abstract central policy and managed requirements. Policies are defined and saved in the system
and they are not changed very quickly. It means that the rate of changing policies is rare.
The PBAC is assumed to be a standard version of the ABAC model for supporting particular
governance of objectives. The PBAC acquires attributes associated to the resource, the requester,
and the environment with information of the set of conditions under which the access request is
made. In addition, this model uses a set of rules that specify whether or not the access is allowed.
In the ABAC model, attributes, which are defined to have access to a particular resource, are
designed on a local level and might be different from one social network to another social
network. In the PBAC model, the social network can define one policy governing access to all
resources that meet particular criteria, and this policy might be enforced for all attempts to access
the resource, no matter where resources are hosted on the social network. The PBAC can be
thought as a much more complicated model, and there is a need of a mechanism to define policy
in an unambiguous term. It is vital that policies must be clear and unambiguous; otherwise, there
is potential for an unauthorized access to a resource with which a specified policy is associated.
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There is also required to ensure that PBAC creates attributes by using the way that ABAC uses,
and uses these attributes for accessing resources.
1.4. Proposed Model
Recently, people are choosing to pursue their connection and public relations due to the
greater flexibility and affordability of online communication. As more people engage in online
communication through social network sites, requirement for protecting information and
resources becomes essential. In this research, we investigate the access control requirements to
conserve data shared in social network sites or organizations from disapproved access. In
pursuance of achieving the goal, a new method has been defined enabling users to define policies
easily in order to protect their individual information and resources from unauthorized users.
Moreover, it allows requestors to generate inquiry in an easy and an efficient way.
This method controls access to an object by evaluating requestor’s attributes, object’s
attributes, an action or operation taken by a requestor (such as read, write, or alter), environment
conditions, and policies which are created by users or the super user of social network sites to
protect the object. This approach is an appropriate method to enforce access control in a dynamic
way and is called Policy-Based Attribute Access Control (PBAAC). The PBAAC uses ABAC
and PBAC models. Under this proposed model and unlike the ABAC model, users are able to
define attributes arbitrarily; no pre-defined list of attributes exist in this model. Furthermore,
unlike the PBAC, this model empowers users to define policies to protect their own resources; no
pre-defined policies exist in this model and rate of adding new policies may be high. We also
explore the access control requirements of an object in case the object is composed of other
objects. This model offers an appropriate solution in case that several policies conflict with each
other. Furthermore, this model can be extended. The extended model includes various social
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network sites which are able to share their data and assets, whilst these social network sites are
not connected to each other directly. One specific social network, which is called supervision,
acts as an intermediary among others.
Since data of social network sites are stored on cloud servers, there are many security
requirements such as controlling user authentication and establishment of secure communication
among servers. These are out of our research scope. In this method, we just focus on access
control requirements for social networks.
In the rest of this document, basic concepts, terminologies and entities that exist in this
method will be explained. Finally, for the PBAAC model and the extended model, basic
notations and formulations of how policy language will be defined will be described.
1.5. Contribution of this Dissertation
Under this dissertation the following contributions are accomplished:
•

The PBAAC model built based upon collaboration of ABAC model enables users to define
attributes arbitrarily. There is no pre-defined list of attributes for this model.

•

The PBAAC model enables users to define various policies to govern their resources and put
inquiries in order to access or carry out an operation on a resource in the most effective way.

•

The PBAAC is an access control model built based on the authorization decision. This model
enforces finer-grained access control in both a central and extended systems.
o The basic or fundamental PBAAC model is designed for one social network site or one
organization. In order to sufficiently share resources and enforce access control, the
PBAAC model uses a specific data model, which captures data in a directed graph
format. This format allows efficient way to extract information through a graph search.
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o The enterprise PBAAC model is designed for a homogeneous collection of either social
network sites or organizations. Beside the collection of social network sites, this model
includes a supervision to make a connection between these social network sites. Having
an effective way for sharing resources and enforcing access control, the enterprise
PBAAC model employs several independent graph data models in which one graph
contributes to other graphs through the supervision graph.
•

Due to using natural language to generate policies and inquiries, the PBAAC model utilizes a
language specification convertor to transform policy and inquiry to a well-formed expression.
This expression follows the format like: (subject, action, object, condition) to present rules
and requests. By adoption of this definition, rules might be a nested expression which means
the subject and the object could be a well-formed expression also.

•

The PBAAC model offers a technique to enforce access control for an object when it is a
compounding of other objects. Each comprised object has its own rules to manage the access.

•

The PBAAC model determines a solution, which extracting rules partially fulfilling the
received request but all extracted rules may not exist together and all may not be true
together. The proposed model uses three criteria to choose a rule that fulfills the request.

•

The PBAAC model utilizes rules and attributes to accept or reject a request. This model
defines a compromise between having more simple rules, while every rule addresses an
entity directly by using the name of the entity and having fewer rules while every rule
addresses the entity by using several attributes of entity. Data analysis proves that higher
numbers of basic rules improve or speed up the performance of the system.
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1.6. Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers some background and
related works. Chapter 3 introduces a basic or fundamental PBAAC model that serves as the
foundation of policy-based attribute access control model. This chapter explains the conversion
of natural language to a well-formed format and access control decision engine, and provides a
solution in case of existing conflicts among rules. Chapter 4 explains the distributed or enterprise
PBAAC model that represents a homogeneous structure of cooperating with several social
network sites or organizations. Chapter 5 discusses the evaluation and contribution of the
PBAAC model. Chapter 6 presents functions and algorithms used in fundamental and enterprise
models. Functions are used for traversing parts of the graph which are related to the request and
rules, and extracting information from nodes and relationship among nodes. Algorithms are
defined to simulate the proposed model and to determine which parameters played an important
role in order to reach a better running time. Chapter 7 provides a discussion of future works and
conclusion of this dissertation, and the final chapter is assigned to the bibliography.
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2. Background
2.1

Authentication, Access control, Audit
Protection of information in universal infrastructure requires a combined solution from

technology, public policy (law), and organizational and individual policies. Advent of various
services in the digital world causes the development of effective and flexible secure models and
languages. This chapter aims to review various models and languages defined to apply access
control mechanism to secure information.
Before defining access control models, investigation of several foundations for information
and system security is helpful. Sandhu [5] provided some clear definition for fundamental
principle of information and system security. These are authentication, access control, and audit.
Authentication provides the identity of a user for using the system, in most cases this reaches by
using of password. Authentication might be computer-to-computer, process-to-process, or
mutual in both. The most usual authentication is user-to-computer authentication which may be
determined based on the following groups:
•

Something a user creates and knows, such as password.

•

Something a user possesses, such as a smart card or a credit-card-sized cryptographic token.

•

Something a user displays in a biometric signature like a voiceprint or a fingerprint.
After access control authentication is applied, access control mechanism determines which

party will allow another to do an action against a resource. Access control mechanism requires
authentication as a prerequisite. There are several methods for implementing access control
mechanism and Sandhu addressed just a few of them [5]. Later in this chapter most of the wellknown methods will be investigated.
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Finally, audit is a typical way of recording the type of a resource access occurring on a social
network. In order to discover any security violation, the audit process collects data of all actions
happened in the system and analyzes them. Enormous amount of audit data might be recorded.
Because of having lots of auditing places on a system, it is thoughtful to pick and choose which
activity types require recording, based upon the organization's security policy [81]. Once any
violation is suspected, analysis of the data is performed. Audit has two components such as the
collection and organization of audit data [5].
The purpose of defining access control mechanism is to confine the actions or operations that
an authorized user of a computer system can perform. Sandhu et al. [47] explained access control
mechanism and its relationship to other security models such as authentication, auditing, and
administration. Access control cooperates with other security services in a computer system. It is
enforced by a reference monitor that intervenes in every request generated by users and objects
in the system. The reference monitor uses authorization database to determine if the user who
attempts to do an action is authorized to run that action. In this model users may be allowed to
alter the authorization database. For instance, they may set permission for their files. Access
control mechanism is different from authentication. Access control mechanism assumes that
authentication of a user has been proved successfully before to enforcement of access control
through reference monitor. Access control mechanism is not a complete solution for securing a
system. It must be collaborated with auditing. Auditing controls inductive analysis of all requests
and activities of users in the system. Auditing stores all user requests and activities for later
analysis.
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2.2

Access Control System Evaluation Metrics
In order to evaluate access control methods, Hu et al. [51] defined several metrics. Access

control system determines valid activities of legitimate users, filters every attempt to access a
resource in an organization performed by users. Access control empowers organizations
determining the degree to which their data might be protected and shared among their users. Hu
et al. [52] defined properties for quality of access control model in terms of the configurable
parameters and limitations of the implemented mechanism. These properties are grouped into
four categories as follows:
•

Administration: this considers the cost, efficiency, and performance of an access control
system.

•

Enforcement: this presents mechanisms or algorithms that access control system uses to
perform access control models and rules.

•

Performance: this considers proficiency of the access control system’s processes.

•

Support: this presents properties that are not fundamental but that could increase the usability
and portability of access control system.
Hu et al. [52] also defined several metrics to be able to compare properties of current

configuration or future development of an access control models. As access control policies
present the operation requirements of an organization, the metrics evaluate the access control
policies operations. Chapter 5 of this document presents metrics that are satisfied by our model.
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2.3

Access Control Implementation
The following lists represents methods implementing access control concept.

Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary access control (DAC) is based on the idea that an owner of data determines
who is allowed to have access to their resources. DAC allows data to be copied from one
resource to another resource freely, so even if the access to the original resource is denied, access
to the copied resource is granted.
DAC allows individual to set an access control mechanism to accept or reject access to an
object. Hence, object’s owner or anyone else who is authorized to access the object is allowed to
control the object [55]. Under the DAC model, individuals decide upon the access control policy
on their data, regardless of whether or not those policies harmonize with the global policies.
Hence, if there is a global policy, the DAC has trouble to ensure consistency in global policies.
Moreover, in the DAC model, an owner of an object can easily change the DAC policy, so a
malicious program running by the owner can change the DAC policies on behalf of the owner.
The following presents several more drawbacks of the DAC model [52].
•

Information can be copied from one object to another, so there is no guarantee of
controlling the passing information in the system.

•

No control defines for the information when a user has received it.

•

Having access to an object is defined only by the owner of the object.

Mandatory Access Control
Generally, all access control policies are grouped in the class of non-discretionary access
control (NDAC) except the DAC model. As the name implies, policies in this model are rules
that are not established at the discretion of the user [52].
14

In mandatory access control there is a policy for entire organization regulates who is able to
have access to an object and individuals cannot alter that access control policy. This means that
access control policies are determined by a central authority, not by individual owner of an
object, so the owner is not allowed to define or change the access controls. Multilevel security
models namely the Bell-La Padula and Biba Integrity models are used to specify the MAC model
[52].
List of Access Control – Working Draft
Access Control Lists (ACL) are one of the oldest and most basic forms of access control
mechanisms. ACL came into picture in 1970s when multiuser systems require limiting access to
data on shared systems. The notion of an ACL is very simple. Each resource, as object, has its
own list of mapping between a set of entities that have an access permission to the resource and a
set of actions that each entity is allowed to perform on the resource [58]. Although ACL are
generally used in the operating systems on a single system, the ACL notion has also
implemented in other contexts like network contexts where an access to a target resource might
be controlled. Some applications also manage access control lists to determine which users are
allowed to view certain data. The advantage of ACL is almost simplicity in implementation. This
means that they do not need much complex technological infrastructure to work. On the other
hands, ACL have their limitations. The disadvantage of this approach is that ACL cannot manage
huge number of users. ACL for specific resources must be checked every time the resource is
accessed, and this can be an inefficient access control approach. Moreover, sometimes ACL
control applications and system accesses. So if a user wishes to access a file, the file that the user
tries to access runs ACL lookup, and the application trying to open the file runs ACL lookup.
ACL might be also hard to control an enterprise setting where several people require having
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different access levels to several resources. Furthermore, adding, deleting, and changing ACL
owned by an individual resource can be time consuming.
Access Control Matrix
Access Control Matrix (ACM) is a conceptual model that determines the rights that each
object is gained by a subject. ACM is a two dimensional array in which each row reflects a
subject, each column reflects an abject, and each entry is a set of access rights for that subject to
that object. This means each cell in the matrix determines the access authorization for the subject
in the row to the object in the column. One drawback of using ACM model is wasting memory
because generally the ACM is sparse. It means that most subjects are not legible to have access
to objects. The ACM model might be presented as a list of triples with form, <subject, right,
object>. This method used rarely because searching a huge number of these triples is inefficient
[53]. Sandhu et al. [47] audited the ACM model and defined a new approach for implementing
the access matrix in practical systems. The access control process might make ensure that only
those operations authorized by the access matrix are executed.
Separation of Duty
Under this method no user should take enough privilege to harm the system. Separation of
Duties (SOD) can be performed statistically by defining conflicts among roles or dynamically by
implementing the control at access time [52]. Hence, under the SOD used in workflow [55] and
Role-Based Access Control model, membership in one role might prevent the user from being a
member of one or more other roles. There are various types of SOD and an important one is
History-Based Access Control Model [52].
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Domain and Type Enforcement
This method categorized processes into domains and objects into types, therefore an access is
limited from domains to types between domains. Any time, by sending a signal or executing a
file in a new domain, a process of one domain is transported to other domains [54]. This method
is a static approach to security that supports the fundamental of basic privileges. Tidswell et al.
[82] proposed a dynamically configurable of domain and type enforcement. Under this method
access control table could be modified in order to configure controls determined in a Rule-Based
Access Control. Although this method provides some simplicity and efficiency, updating the
access control table is time consuming.
Temporal Constraints
Temporal Constraints are type of access policies that involve time-based limitation on access
to resource. In some cases, Temporal Constraints may limit the resource usage and in another
case they may control time-sensitive activities [52].
Workflow
Workflow is a presentation of an organizational process in which all resources and tasks are
passed from one participant to another; this process is governed by rules or procedures. The goal
of the workflow policy is maintaining consistency between the internal data and external
expectation of data [57].
Role-Based Access Control
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is an access control model. The key concept of the
RBAC model is a role. Users are grouped into several roles, although they can be easily denied
the roles. A set of permissions assigned to a role and can be modified as needed by the system.
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Permissions assigned to roles determine which role is allowed to do which actions against a
resource such as access, update, or delete. The roles might be organized in a role hierarchy to
represent the organization’s authority structure [61].
Based on the RBAC definition, an access to a resource is determined in terms of the
relationship between the requester and the organization or owner of the resource. As a matter of
fact, the roles of users are defined in terms of their responsibilities on the organization. Hence,
the role of the requester will determine whether access will be granted or denied. RBAC allows
one person has the same role as others have. RBAC might include many groups of persons and
each group categorizes individuals in terms of who fulfills a particular role. This means that one
set of access control permissions on a particular resource can be set once for all persons of the
organization. In modified RBAC model ideal users are allowed to be a member of multiple
groups. This means that users can have several roles at the same time. RBAC supports the
permission hierarchies and inheritance while more concise permissions override more general
permissions. Despite of many advantages, RBAC has its own disadvantages. One of the
highlighted is the fact that grouping people in terms of their roles makes it more difficult to
define limited number of accessing controls for each person. It is necessary to create precise set
of roles to exclude specific persons who fall into particular role, but don’t necessarily need to
have the full rights access compare to the other members of the group. Hence, there is required a
model to determine attributes for individuals to differentiate members of the group and to
selectively grant or deny access based on the set of attributes. Due to fulfill this requirement,
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model was designed.
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) initiated a method for assigning users
to roles dynamically to enforce access control a resource [73]. Jin et al. [70] extended a method
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and added a function to constrain permissions of a role by using user’s attributes. Attributes take
certain entities and return values for defined properties of that entity. Each entity (e.g. user and
object) has a finite set of attributes. This model defined a permission filtering policy which
constrains the available set of permissions in terms of a user and an object attributes. This
method did not offer a tradeoff between existing the number of roles and the number of
attributes.
Privacy-aware Role-Based Access Control (PRBAC) model defined a method to prevent
private data and resource from unauthorized users [71, 72]. This model was extended form of
RBAC model and defined by Ferraiolo et al. [73]. This model supports the idea of assigning
users to roles and grants permission based on the users’ attributes and roles hierarchy. The
important point of employing hierarchy is because of easy management of permission
assignment. Hierarchy PRBAC provides lots of flexibility but after modeling it was disclosed
that specifying all policies in the system needs lots of permission assignments. Arora et al. [74]
defined a method to address this issue.
Al-Kahtani et al. [59] defined a method named Rule-Based Role-Based Access Control, for
assigning users to roles dynamically in terms of a finite set of rules defined by the enterprise
security policy. Users have attributes to save information for identifying themselves. Rules use
users’ attributes and any constraints set determined by enterprise. Under this model rule might
have priority to assign a user to a particular role which means a rule could override other rules. A
role might be hierarchically related to one or more roles. Besides, a role could have one or more
attributes. In this model role must be defined as initializing step. Their previous work did not
provide enough explanation for role relationship and its outcome [67].
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Park et al. [62] presented RBAC to enforce access control to resources in a large-scale web
environment. They defined a method to implement RBAC on the web. In this method system
administrator assigns users to roles in terms of users’ responsibilities in the enterprise.
Herzberg et al. [63] presented a trust establishment system that maps users to predefined
roles. The system uses a well-defined logical rules to map users to roles. Rules associated to each
role define how a client can be assigned to that role. This assignment is computed based on the
certificate related to a specific client and the decision is made based on the client’s qualification
for a specific role. This method uses rules individually and does not pay attention to relation that
might be exist among rules.
Yau et al. [64] defined RBAC method using dynamic role activation dependency rather than
role hierarchy recognition. A set of parameterized rules activates every role. The strong point of
this method is good expressing rules and conditions associated to rules. The weak point of this
model is lack of defining role hierarchy which causes capturing various relations existed among
roles and confusing to assign a user to a specific role.
Zhong et al. [60] defined a method for using Rule-Based Access Control on the Web and
assigning a user to a specific role. This assignment is accomplished in terms of the existing
policies and trustworthiness threshold determined by the system administrator. User’s
trustworthiness identifies the degree which the system believes that a user will not do harm to the
system. This degree is accumulated steadily over time and decreased if harmful actions are
discovered. Under this method a mischievous user can logon to the system for a long time
without performing any suspicious acts, so he gains lots of credits which may enable him to
make a tremendous damage on the system. This is a major drawback for this method.
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Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) manages applications and browsers
applications that grant permission for read/write access to directories supporting X.500 protocols
[65]. LDAP stores roles in directories and retrieves once as needed. LDAP also supports
dynamic groups. A dynamic group is assigned a membership list of distinguished names that is
assumed using LDAP searching criteria. The dynamic membership list can be used to identify
group’s access control subjects [66]. This feature could be used to automatically assign users to
roles in enterprise system. LDAP returns a list of roles which there are no logical relationships
among roles.
Liu et al. [68] presented a method for Attribute and Role-Based Access Control (ARBAC)
for web services. This model automatically generated a set of role based on the user’s attributes,
created a mapping among users, permissions and roles, and defined an access control for web
services and resources. Under this model user’s attributes are static and users only have predefined attributes.
Saunders et al. [69] defined a model of Role-Based Access Control based on the access
matrix. This model uses access control matrix concept which specified individual relationship
between subjects wishing access to resources and system resources or objects they are given
access requests. In a two-dimensional array, for each subject-object pair the allowable access
appears in the related entry. In this model each object allows to store the access control matrix,
so when a subject wishes to access an object, the system needs to do some search in that matrix
and then derives the result. Saving access control matrix for each object might be a drawback of
this model.
Cruz et al. [43] described a security framework for participant, users or applications, that
dependent to Role-Based Access Control model. In this approach roles are pre-defined and
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formed in a hierarchy, although users are not identified previously. Users are allowed to perform
an action in terms of their attributes values, and values of the attributes belonging to the
resources. Hence, the actions that users can perform are dynamically determined. These values
might change over time (e.g. the user’s location), hence the result of evaluation of accessing to a
resource must be changed over time. When the number of users is more than the number of roles,
defining an automated way to allocate roles to users is reasonable. Privileges granted to users
might be differ among users. In other words, different users have different authority depending
on their status. In this approach the roles assigned to each user are designed in a hierarchy where
higher roles have all the privilege of lower roles.
Saffarian et al. [44] proposed a dynamic user-role assignment method for remote access
control where an outsider makes inquiry to access to a resource of an organization. In remote
access control system, the requestor is not registered and he is not a member of the organization.
So he has not been assigned to specific role. This proposed method gives least privilege to
outsider without downgrading the efficiency of the access control system. Moreover, this method
uses credential and past behavior of outsider to give privilege to access a resource and outsider
cannot compensate the lack of credential by having a good past behavior.
Bertino et al. [37] defined a physical extension of RBAC model called Triggered Role-Based
Access Control (TRBAC). TRBABC supports regular enabling and disabling role and physical
dependencies among actions activated by role triggers. Role trigger actions may be performed
immediately or postponed to a particular time. Postponing action may help to solve conflicting
actions.
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Attribute-Based Access Control
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) was defined by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) for the first time to improve data sharing where data are supervised [10].
ABAC represents a part of logical access control that consists of Access Control List, RoleBased Access Control, and Attribute-Based Access Control models. ABAC model determines
access to resources based upon the evaluation of attributes. ABAC is an access control model
which is based on the set of characteristics, or attributes associated with resource, requester, and
the environment. Attributes store various data of entity to unify them. Generally, an access is
granted or denied to a user, who requests to perform an action like read from an object or write to
an object, based on the identity of that user. This identity may be defined either directly or with
predefined property types such as roles which are attached to that user [10]. We should have a
method to manage the access control in a dynamic way. This means that we need to define a
method in order to control the access of objects by evaluating operations, environmental
conditions relevant to a request, and rules stored in the property of the user. ABAC method is a
solution to grant or deny user access based on attributes of the target user, target resource, and
environment conditions. ABAC has been defined in different ways. A paper on web services
provides a definition for ABAC like “grants access to services based on the attributes belonging
to the requestor” [11]. A geographic information system describes ABAC as “a method which
values of attributes belonging to users determine the coalition of users with privileges” [12].
Another paper defined ABAC as a model that is based on the attributes of subject, object, and
environmental condition and supports both discretionary and mandatory access control
requirements [13]. Fortunately, there is a reasonable unanimity that ABAC defines access by
matching the current value of user attributes, resource attributes, and environmental conditions
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with the requirements defined by access control rules. Regarding this definition, if a user
requests to access to a resource, access control mechanism evaluates user attributes, object
attributes, environment condition, and rules to make a decision. Finally, subject is given
permission to access a resource if it is authorized. ABAC offers a subtle access control approach
which accepts numerous discrete inputs for making access control decision and then provides a
big set of possible combination of those inputs which are match with request. ABAC should be
able to empower resource owners to determine access control policy without prior knowledge of
the specific requestor. It means that as new users join the social network, rules do not need to be
revised. The access control policy implemented in ABAC are confined only by the
computational language and the robustness available attributes.
One restriction of ABAC method is that in large environment with large number of resources
and users, there might be various attributes and access control mechanisms across the
organization. It is often necessary to reconcile access control throughout the organization to meet
enterprise administration requirements. To alleviate this limitation, Policy-Based Access Control
facilitates organization to have more homogeneous access control scheme across the
organization.
Yuan el at. [20] explained the ABAC model by concentrating on its authorization
architecture and policy formulation in order to define an approach to apply ABAC model to
securing web services. They assumed that ABAC model includes two parts: the policy model
which defines all policy in the ABAC model and the architecture model which employs the
policies to control the access to the web services. In their approach, ABAC model defines
agreements based on the security characteristics which called as attributes. They defined three
types of attribute such as subject attribute, object attribute, and environment attribute. As it is
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seen, the attributes were attached to three different types of entity such as subject, object, and
environment of the web based system. Generally, each type of attribute, provides the identity and
characteristic of related entity. After defining attribute, they defined policy by using attributes. It
means that policy rule decides whether or not grant access to an object based on attributes of
subject, object, and environment condition. These policies are defined by the system. They show
the advantages of ABAC by comparing this method to role-based method.
Hai-bo et al. [22] described administrative scalability and control granularity which those are
the serious problem in web services. Web services technology enables organization to
accomplish their software as service. Web services environment is a distributed system and
implemented between heterogeneous systems. Hence they are different comparison of objects
typically protected in conventional systems. In order to protect objects in web services system,
Hai-bo et al. [22] offered ABAC method as an effective solution. ABAC method identifies which
attributes should be employed in order to get access to a certain service. Again in this model
attributes are belonging to the entities of the system. Besides, they offered automated trust
negotiation mechanism to disclosure the sensitive attribute. The proposed approach used
TrustBuilder [23] to describe attribute credentials and trust negotiation policy. In this model
TrustBuilder runs on server and decides how sensitive information is disclosed to the other
parties. When a user requests on the web browser, the request is sent to the web server. The web
server asks ABAC module to evaluate its access control policies and decide whether this request
should be accepted, denied, or reevaluated.
Enterprise ABAC concept
As mentioned before, ABAC is able to share data and information. Moreover, ABAC is able
to be deployed through enterprise model. In this case the components collaborating to implement
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ABAC get more complex. NIST provides a definition to explain enterprise; it is “a collaboration
or federation among entities for which information sharing is required and managed” [10].
Regarding this definition, most enterprises have various components and form of identity and
credential management to manage entities existing in the enterprise. Correspondingly, many
enterprises may have some organizational policies for building rules validating subject’s access
to enterprise objects. NIST suggests enterprise subject attributes will be created, stored, and
shared through enterprise regarding subject attribute management capability. Similarly,
enterprise object attributes will be established and connect to objects regarding an object
attribute management capability. Attributes must be named, assigned a set of valid values,
assigned a schema, and companioned to subjects and objects. Attributes shared through
enterprise should be placed, retrieved, validated, updated, and revoked [10]. The enterprise
ABAC model should have numerous functions that are responsible for computing access
decision by enforcing policy decision in response to a request from subject requesting an access
to an object protected by own policy, retrieving attributes belonging to specific object or data
required for policy evaluation, and executing the workflow that defines the order in which
attributes and policies must be retrieved and accomplished.
Policy-Based Access Control
Attributes store various data of entity to unify the entity. Each attribute is a distinct field that
a policy can use to determine whether or not to accept or reject an access resource. Policy-Based
Access Control (PBAC) is an access control method and enables organization to governance
their resources by defining policies. Organizations define policies and administration structures
to ensure the successful execution of organization’s mission. Furthermore, they need to generate
policies that define who and under which circumstances should have access to which resources.
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PBAC is assumed to be a standard version of the ABAC model at an enterprise model for
supporting particular governance objectives. PBAC combines attributes associated to resource,
requester, and environmental condition with information of set of conditions. These conditions
define under which the access request is made and uses set of rules that specify whether or not
the access is allowed. In ABAC model, the attributes needed to have access to a particular
resource are designed on a local level and might be different from one organization to another
organization. In the PBAC model, the organization can define one policy governing access to all
resources that meet particular criteria, and this policy might be enforced for all attempts to access
the resource, no matter where resources are managed by any organization. PBAC can be said that
much more complicated model, and there is need a mechanism to define policy in unambiguous
term. It is vital that policies must be clear and unambiguous; otherwise, there is potential for
unmanaged access to a resource with which a specified policy is associated. There is also a need
to ensure enterprise creates attributes by using the same way and uses the same attributes for
access resources.
Relationship-Based Access Control
In social network site, users and resources are connected via different types of relationships.
Cheng at al. [14] defines user-to-user relationships as a basis form for social network sites. In
this model, which is based on the relationship-based access model, user-to-user relationships
have an important role in indicating and implementing access control. This research developed a
path checking algorithm to investigate if the suitable relationship path between users for a given
access request exist.
Access control based on mutual relationships was defined by Cheng at al. [15]. They
combined Attribute-Based Policies with Relationship-Based Access Control. Defining the access
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requirement is based on the attributes of users, attributes of relationships, and environmental
conditions. A Relationship-Based Access Control model is implemented based on three
important factors: relationship type, depth, and strength. Consequently, this method uses the
path-checking algorithm for finding a path or a series of relationships which satisfy the attributebased requirement [15]. Carminati at al. [75, 76] recommend a type of Relationship-Based
Access Control model where trust level, type, and depth of interpersonal relationships are
defined as key decisions for authorization. Nonetheless, using relationship alone is not sufficient
for controlling the access to resources. Hence, Cheng at al. [15] consolidated attribute-based
policies into relationship-based access control. While these models have their own advantages,
one drawback of two models is traversing the long path to accept or deny a request, which is
definitely time-consuming.
Social network systems lead a pattern of control access which is distinct from traditional
access control approach. Gates [38] identified the term Relationship-Based Access Control to
refer to this pattern. According Gates’ definition a pattern of access control needs to be
developed in terms of interpersonal relationship. Relationship-Based Access Control has been
defined based on tracking of interpersonal relationship between users and explanation of access
control policies in terms of these relationships. Fong [39] defined the requirements for extending
the applicability of Relationship-Based Access Control to application domains rather than social
computing. Fong formulated a sample Relationship-Based Access Control model to capture the
paradigm. That was an authorization decision which was based on the relationship between the
resource owner and the accessed resource. This model defined policy language in terms of the
logic model. Fong offered two features. First, the social networks used in this model are polyrelational which means this model tracks not only a relationship existing between two
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individuals, but also the type of relationship. Second, the model tracks multiple access contexts.
Relationships may be defined in separate contexts and the access contexts are organized into a
tree-shaped hierarchy. This hierarchy represents a sharing mechanism known as relationship
inheritance. When an access is requested in this hierarchy, the relationship expressed in all the
ancestors’ contexts are combined with the relationships in the target access context to respond
the access request.
Fong et al. [40] added two features to the policy language in the previous Relationship-Based
Access Policy. They described that relational policy cannot be expressed in the relationshipbased access control, and the limitation is because of the lack of support for disjoint
intermediaries and vertex identification. After adding two features, owner-checkable policy and a
super set of relational policies, to the Relationship-Based Access Control, the new method was
generated. Moreover, they described that this model is able to define every finite relational
policy. Finally, they defined a policy language that is adequate for expressing useful
Relationship-Based Access Control policies.
Trust Management
Trust management is an approach for authorization and access control in open, decentralized,
and distributed systems [45]. In centralized system or traditional access control mechanism all
users such as owners of resources and requestors are registered. They have access to the system
by using their credential or identity, so authorization decision is made in terms of the identity of
the requestors. On the contrary, in the decentralized systems the users may not be registered into
system and the resource owner and requestor are usually unknown to each other and access
control based on the identity might be ineffective. Hence, based on the trust management
approach, access control decision is made in terms of policy statements defined by all parties in
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the system. Some statements, which are called credential, are defined and created the time when
users signed up to the system. Credential is used for user authentication in future. Some
statements which are called access rules, might be defined and stored in trusted storage. They
govern access a resource [45]. In trust management mechanism, a requestor generates a request.
Authorizer, who determines access control rules regulating access to the requested resource,
receives the request and check the requestor’s permission.
Ninghui et al. [46] introduced a framework for role-based trust management languages for
describing credentials and policies in decentralized authorization. It is a part of addressing the
security problems which appears when independent organizations enter into combinations whose
all participants change quickly. In the combination of several organizations, some of
organizations might be autonomous organizations planning to share resources. In this case every
organization has authority over the resources to control the access to those. This system will be
called decentralized collaborative systems which does not longer have single central authority.
Golbeck et al. research [16] payed attention to trust in social network and determine how
trust information should be mentioned and integrated into applications. They focus on how much
we trust to others to give them access to our resources. Their method assigns a value as trust
rating exist between two users who are indirectly connected. Marsh [17] formalized trust as a
computational concept. Because his model was based on social and psychological factors and
highly theoretical, this was complex and difficult to implement. His focus was about interacting
agent that could maintain information about history and observed behaviors, so it was improper
for use in social networks. For multi-agent systems, Castefranchi and Falcone [18, 19] denoted
an analysis of trust. Their work was based on the psychological literature and includes many
psychological factors.
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Zuo et al. [21] developed a method to make a decision based on object trust management.
This decision will be yield in terms of various defined policies and assists users in selecting safe
and secure information in an open system. In this method, information integrity will be evaluated
based on the quality and security features of a given piece of information. This method accepts
external information with the required level of quality and security in an open environment.
Policy Analysis
Kolovski [24] compared all existing approaches for access control policy analysis in web
services. This means that all approaches defined methods to protect the sensitive information in
web. Hence there is a need for adequate security and privacy support. Finally, all approaches
required to define appropriate access control policy languages for environments which are large,
open, distributes, and heterogeneous. These languages have objectives to be expandable and
flexible. They might have adequate features to be expressive and distributing access control
policy. Although some approaches used XACML or WS-Policy languages, these are unclear in
terms of impacts and consequences of their access control policy.
Kolovski’s research was a survey including policy languages that have formal semantics and
provided algorithms for access control policy analysis. Moreover, Kolovski defined the existing
policy languages (XACML, WS-Policy, ODRL, XrML) which provide a formal semantics and
policy analysis service which previously was inconvenient for the specific language. Based on
Kolovski’s research policy languages might be categorized by two groups. The first group or
logic-based access control policy language are based on Datalog mostly. Hence, if an access
request satisfies the access control policy, it will be completed in PTME. Woo et al. [25] is one
of the earliest definition of logic-based framework for denoting authorization. They expressed
using a default logic to model control rules and authorization. They fragmented the logic to
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extended logic program which ran in polynomial time. They also formalized the Bell-La Padula
security model [26]. Another approach was Delegation Logic [27] which was based on the logic
programs and identified delegation depth and supported a huge spectrum of complex principles.
This approach didn’t comment policies analysis and verification. Another framework for
reasoning in open distributed systems was PeerAccess [28] that provided a declarative
description of the behavior of peers that information comes from other specific peers selectively.
PeerAccess is a local knowledge base and encodes the basic knowledge of each peer. Using
defined policy, PeerAccess made decision to release information to other peers. This model is
similar to PeerTrust [29]. Other policy languages supporting delegation are: Abadi et al. [32],
Becker [49], Binder [93], and Cassandra [33, 84]. All but Abadi et al use Datalog as fundamental
for syntax and semantics. Proof-carrying authorization [34] which is an authorization framework,
is based on a higher order logic which used to control the proofs is undecidable, and this problem
does not force users to generate proofs by their own. Jajodia [35] proposed a logical policy
language for authorization. This policy language allows users to specify policy language in terms
of which accessing control decision are to be made. One of the earliest approach is Ulman et al.
[36] which allows having various numbers of subjects, roles, resources, and authorizations.
Although this method is very expressive and it could model almost production system, there is
no practical solution if a given subject can gain an access to a given object.
Multilevel Security
People and information are classified into different levels of trust. These levels represent the
well-known security classification such as unclassified, confidential, secrete, and top secret.
Bell-La Padula defines a model based on the multilevel security model [26].
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Team-Based Access Control
Alotaiby et al. [41] defined a model which is built on the role-based access control. This
model allowed certain users to join a team in terms of their existing roles in an organization and
team specification. These users are allowed to request to get permission to have access the
resources existing in this organization. This model was based on the Role-Based Access Control,
so access control management is accomplished by associating roles to users. A team is a
collection of users who have different responsibilities in that team. Hence, users having various
roles are allowed to join the team and in terms of their role they have permission to access
protected object existing in the organization. Sometimes users require to have various roles in
team. Therefore, this model defined a session which maps one user to one or more roles. Session
might confine the users to accept a certain role which are needed to join the team. A user might
have active multiple sessions at the same time, but in different teams.
Thomas [42] introduced Team-Based Access Control model for applying Role-Based Access
Control in cooperating environments. The main concept in team-based access control model is a
team which is a collection of users who are assigned with specific role in order to accomplish a
specific task or goal. Users with various set of qualifications and responsibilities are mapped to
various roles. The first consideration was having a hybrid access control model bringing
advantages of having Role-Based Access Time. The second consideration was recognizing the
context association with collaborative tasks and ability to apply this context to decision in terms
of permission activation.
Access Control in Online Social Network
Park et al. [48] developed an access control framework for online social network by grasping
the concept of user activity. This framework encompassed individual privacy for user activities
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and resources by separating individualized user and resource activities. Under this model three
main components have been defined such as user, sessions, and activities. Each activity
comprises of an action, zero or more target resources, and zero or more target users. In this
framework, users are associated with user attributes and policies. User attributes provides
properties and information about the user. User policies provides rules determining confinement
and preferences. A session represents active users who logged into the online social network. In
this framework ability to distinguish active user those who are online and non-active user those
who are not online is important. A session could have additional attributes and policies, and a
user might have multiple concurrent session whereas a session associated to exactly one user.
Activities consists both general usage activities and users’ control activities. A session initiates
each activity on behalf of the user. The online social network decides whether or not the activity
has permission. A session might have several activities, whereas each activity is initiated by only
a single session. Each activity might include an action, target resources, and target users. Each
action is a function accessible to users via a session. Target resources include users’ shared asset.
Target resources are involved in an action. Target users are the recipient of an action.
Ontology
Masoumzadeh et al. [50] proposed an ontology-based access control model for social
networks. This model uses semantic web-based technology for describing complex interpersonal
relationships. Furthermore, this model considers the individual user’s right to have a flexible
control over the defined access control related to them.
Fong et al. [77] represented a formal algebraic model for access control in social network site
like Facebook. They define two stages for Facebook-style access control: reaching the search
listing of the resource owner and accessing the resource. This model recognizes two types of
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policies: accessing resources and searching through resources policy. Furthermore, the authors
propose a model for social computing application in which user authorization is performed based
on user-to-user relationships. In order to specify the policy, this model uses a model logic
language [78]. Finally, they improved the model logic language to allow multiple relationship
types and directional relationships [79]. Fan et al. [80] defined an attribute-based access control
model for web services; web services grant access to a user based on attributes of the related
entities. This model uses an automated trust negotiation mechanism to explore some issues
regarding sensitive attributes.
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3. Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Method
3.1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, online communication as a mean to establish public relations
or information and resource sharing has gained a lot of popularity. To ease of information
sharing or access to resources, protecting information and resources becomes an unavoidable
part of online communication. In the last few years, numerous access control methods have been
proposed with a view to maximize protection of resources and information.
Traditionally, access controls are mainly based on identities or role memberships. Therefore,
most of the so-called traditional access controls fail to have a proper solution with the scalability
and dynamicity of social networks. As a result, it is not efficient to specify users with access to
information and resources in a traditional method. Alternatively, Attribute-Based Access Control
(ABAC) have been developed and are currently the most extensively-used access control
mechanisms for social networks. Under this mechanism, access controls are determined in terms
of the properties of users. Users are granted permission to access others’ information or
resources based on their attributes and properties. Hence, there is no requirement in defining
access levels when users are added to social network. Moreover, Policy-Based Access Control
(PBAC) is one of the most considerable access control mechanisms for social networks. In
PBAC, resource or information owners can determine mechanisms to control received access
requests based on the policies, which have been defined and stored in the social network.
In spite of its popularity in both theory and practice, the current PBAC model is still far from
the ideal access control mechanism. Users cannot specify policies in order to protect their
resources in a simple way. Moreover, the ABAC model is not a very robust access control
mechanism. The ABAC can use only the attributes, which are defined as preliminary in the
social networks.
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To address the above-mentioned shortcomings, the work presented in this dissertation
proposes a change in policy-based access control models with the goal of empowering users to
be able to specify their own policies for protecting their resources. A new model incorporates
attribute-based access control into altered policy-based access control and helps providing a
balance between ease-of-use and required level of security will be introduced and discussed. A
format will be formalized to present rules and queries that are converted from policies and
inquiries, respectively. This format will also address the access requirements in terms of the
access to objects by evaluating requestor’s attributes, object’s attributes, action or operation
taken by requestor (such as read, write, or alter), environment conditions, and policies created by
ordinary users or super users of social networks or organizations to protect the associated
resources. This approach, called Policy-Based Attribute Access Control (PBAAC), is an efficient
method to enforce access control in a dynamic way. In order to evaluate the request, the PBAAC
uses Attribute-Based Access Control and Policy-Based Access Control models. The proposed
method also explores the access control requirements for an object in cases where the object is
composed of other objects. This model offers an appropriate solution in cases where several
policies conflict with other policies.
Since social networks’ data are stored on the cloud server, many security requirements such
as user authentication and establishment of secure communication among servers will become
issues of concerns. These aspects of social network security are outside the scope of this
dissertation. Specifically, the focus of this dissertation is mainly on the access control
requirements for social networks.
This chapter presents and discusses the basic concepts, terminologies and entities existing in
the proposed method. This chapter further describes the PBAAC model, basic notations used for
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describing this model, formulations to define policy language, converting policy and inquiry to a
simple format, and evaluating simple forms of policies and inquiries. On the assumption of
facing conflicts among basic formed of policies, the rest of the chapter describes how these
conflicts will be removed.
3.2

Preliminary
This section describes terminology, basic concepts, and entities of the proposed model.

Terminology
The following terminologies are adopted in this dissertation in order to define concepts
existing in the proposed model [84].
● Subject typically represents a class of entities requesting to perform an operation on an object
or taking ownership of an object (i.e. resource). Subjects might be categorized into active and
passive subjects.
Active subject or a person can have three roles such as a user, a supervisor, and an owner of
an object. A user is able to initiate inquiry in the model. Subject may represent an entity who
is the owner of assets and manages all associated information and resources as well.
Moreover, subject can be a supervisor who oversees the social network and controls all
events happening on the social network.
Passive subject or a non-person entity, such as anonymous service or application, may
generate a request on behalf of a person to access an object or to perform an operation on an
object. This process may be triggered as a result of some events in the model. Providing
detailed information about a passive subject and defining a method for adding this entity to
the proposed model will not be considered in this document. This addition is left for future
development.
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● Object generally represents a class of entities receiving an access request. Object could be a
target resource or a target user. Target resource is a class of entities required to be protected
from unauthorized use. Target resources such as information and documents are assets of the
model. Target resources, therefore, are belonged to a subject on the social network.
In order to secure resources against unauthorized access, resources must be managed by a
subject that may be the owner of the object or supervisor of the social network. In other
words, subjects are responsible for determining policies to protect their resources. As will be
mentioned later, a user who protects associated resources will be referred to as controlling
user. A controlling user defines policies for every associated resources and stores the policies
into the corresponding resource’s repository. Once a resource receives an inquiry, that
resource is responsible to respond to the inquiry.
An object sometimes has a role like a subject. In these cases, the object is referred to as target
user, who sets the requirements for protecting associated information from unauthorized
access.
In general, there are two types of resources, simple and compound resource. A simple
resource cannot be split into other simple resources, whilst a compound resource is derived
from other simple resources. The rest of this chapter provides subtle definitions for the two
types of resources.
● Relationships represent communication among entities. Relationship is a class, which defines
connections among subjects, objects, and subjects to objects under different relationship
types. Relationships can also be assumed among entities (i.e. connection between accessing
users and target users) in the social network. In addition, relationships in the virtual world
may represent relationships in the real world. For instance, in a social network site, users
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might connect to each other under various relationship types such as “friend”, “parent”,
“colleague”, or “manager”; relations exist among people in the real world as well.
● Environment condition is a class of dynamic factors that may consist of time and location.
Environment condition is independent of subject and object and may be used as a parameter
for evaluating an inquiry and making a decision to accept or reject that inquiry on the social
network.
● Action is a class of operations or accesses. Generally, action is initiated by a user to access an
object, or to perform an operation against an object.
● Attribute is a characteristic of a subject, an object, a relationship, an action, or an
environment condition. Attributes are used to make each entity unique. Moreover, attributes
utilize social networks to be able to group subjects and objects. There are various sets of
attributes, naming subject attributes, object attributes, relationship attributes, action
attributes, and environment attributes. More descriptions for defining attributes will be
provided later in this chapter.
● Policy is written from the viewpoint of an object or a subject that requires protection from
unauthorized use. Policy is a regulation and defines who, when, where and under what
constraints an inquiry is allowed to perform an action against an object.
● Rule is a converted form of a policy to control all accesses to a particular object. On social
network, rules might be supposed as an asset of a subject or object. These are saved on a
repository belonging to someone, like the supervisor who generates rules hence these rules
must be secured against unmanaged access.
● Inquiry is an expression asking to perform an operation on an object in a social network.
Generally, inquiries are generated by a subject or an accessing user, specifically.
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● Request is a transformed format of inquiry.
● Metadata provides more information about elements existing in our model, such as
relationship metadata, which offers information about the relationship types. We also store
information of adjacent and trusted users. More explanation of adjacent and trusted users will
be provided in the rest of this chapter.
Later, this document will provide detailed description of each element on the social network
and information stored for identifying the element on the social network as well.
In order to present the PBAAC model, the model’s entities, the relationships among entities,
and the attributes and the policies with simple notation attached to each entity, some basic
notations need to be defined at first. These notations are presented in the following.
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Quantifier Notation
Table 1 represents all quantifiers and symbols used in the proposed model.
Symbol

Description

∀

Represents all entities.

∃

Represents that there exists an entity.

∄

Represents that there exists no entity.

∋

Represents a membership of a set.

ϵ

Represents an element of a set.

∉

Represents not an element of a set.

€

Represents a resource belongs to a user.

⥤

Represents a connection between two entities.

--:r -->

This symbol ---> represents a relation and ri identifies the type of the relation.

*

Represents the multiply of weights assigned to each concatenation in a path.

i

(Asterisk)
+

Represents concatenation of connections in a path. (Plus)

⋁

Represents the union of multiple statements. (Disjunctive connective)

⋀

Represents the intersection of multiple statements. (Conjunctive connective)

¬

Represents reverse value of a statement. (Negation)

:

Separates the type and the value of the entity. (Colon)

⊕

Represents an action or operation, which might be run against an object.

⊗

Represents an action mentioned in a rule or a request.

∁

Represents a resource including other simple resources.

⋂

Represents intersection of statements.

⋃

Represents union of statements.
Table 1 – Quantifiers and Symbols

Adjacent user
An adjacent user is one who is in a particular distance from another user. This concept is
defined in terms of the particular distance or particular number of connections between adjacent
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user and another user. Based on the adjacent user definition, a path which connects a user or
source user to its adjacent user or destination user might include several connections, where all
connections must have the same relationship type. It is obvious that there might be various paths
from a source user to a destination user. This definition of who is an adjacent user of another
user (source user) might be provided by the user (source user) or the supervisor in the social
network. More explanation is provided in section 3.5.
Trusted user
A trusted user of a user is defined by the user or the supervisor in the social network. To
define who the trusted user is, social network multiplies the values, each of which is attached to
every connection in a path and defines the degree of loyalty, and then generates a new value as a
result. This result identifies how much, in percentage, a user or source user trusts another user or
destination user. This path connects source user to destination user. If the final value or derived
result meets the definition of trusted user, then the destination user can be defined as trusted user.
Again, like the adjacent user, in one path, which is started from a source user and ended by a
destination user, all connections have to have the same relationship type. It is obvious that there
may be various paths from a source user to a destination user. More explanation is provided in
section 3.5.
3.3

Secure Access Control Model
In this document, a model is defined to support access control in social networks in a highly

dynamic way. In the preliminary section, various elements used in this model were defined. In
order to distinguish an element from other elements, several properties are attached to each
element. Properties add unique identification to the element. These elements are called entities
and the attached properties are called attributes. Attributes are part of the proposed access control
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model, and are specifically used to enforce access control to resources. A model using attributes
to accomplish access to resources is Attribute-Based Access Control model (ABAC).
ABAC represents a part of logical access control that consists of access control lists, rolebased access control, and attribute-based access control method [10]. In brief, ABAC method
determines access to the resources based upon the evaluation of the attributes of the entities
existing in the model.
On the other hand, every entity should be able to protect associated information and
resources from unauthorized access by defining one or more policies. Policy-based access
control (PBAC) is an access control method, which enables social networks to govern their
resources by defining policies. Policies determine who is allowed to have access to which
resources and under what circumstances. The PBAC model may be a complicated model; there is
need a mechanism to define policy in unambiguous terms. It is essential that policies must be
clear and unambiguous; otherwise, there is potential for an unauthorized user to access a
resource with which the ambiguous policy is associated.
The PBAC concept is used in this dissertation to develop the proposed model because the
PBAC model combines attributes with sets of rules. Attributes are associated with resource,
requester, and environment. Rules define access control constraints and determine under which
conditions access to a resource will be granted. Unlike the PBAC model, the proposed model
enables entities to define one or more policies governing access to their own resources and even
some entities are able to define policies on behalf of other entities to supervise all attempts to
access their resources. In this model, there is a unique entity that can regulate other entities and
can dominate other entities. In other words, the policies defined by this unique entity can
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override other policies defined by other entities. This new model, called Policy-Based Attribute
Access Control, is explained in more details in the following section.
3.4

Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Model
Figure 2 shows the basic structure of the Policy-Based Attribute Access Control (PBAAC)

model, which simply represents the elements and the connection among elements. Generally,
five elements, referred to as major elements, are highlighted in this model. These major elements
are subject, object, relationship, action, and decision engine.

Figure 2- Basic PBAAC model
The following gives a brief description of each element:
● The first element is the subject, which accepts different roles; namely user, resource owner,
and supervisor.
A user, referred to as an accessing user, is the only entity capable of initiating a request to
access an object, or performing an operation against an object. An owner of an object,
referred to as a controlling user, is responsible to protect associated assets and individual
information. A super user, called a supervisor, administers the system and oversees all events
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happening in the system. Supervisor defines various policies to manage all operations on the
social network. More information about the supervisor’s responsibilities in the proposed
model will be explained later in this document. It should be pointed out that, in this
dissertation, user and accessing user are used interchangeably and controlling user is often
used to refer to resource owner.
● The second element is the object, which accepts two roles: accessed user and accessed
resource. Accessed users are supposed to receive an access request, such as poke or tagged in
a photo, and resources like software resource (e.g. document or photos) and hardware
resource (e.g. printer or scanner) are supposed to receive an operation such as update or
delete. The object, which will be given a request, is assumed to provide an appropriate
response to the received request. In this document, target user is an exemplification of an
accessed user and target resource is an exemplification of a resource. We use target resource
and resource interchangeably.
● The third element is the relationship, which denotes connection among elements.
Relationship may be identified by various types. Later in this chapter, more explanation
about relationship types and corresponding metadata will be provided.
● The fourth element is the action, which is requested by a subject to access to an object or to
perform an operation against an object; this subject may be supervisor or accessing user.
Note that, in a social network, there are various actions that will be addressed later in this
chapter.
● The last element is the decision engine. In brief, the decision engine receives inquiries and
designates whether or not the subject (or accessing user) is allowed to access the object or
perform an operation on the object. In order to approve or deny the given inquiry, the
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decision engine evaluates the inquiry. This means that the decision engine collects all
necessary information and policies from the model and then reaches a result. This result may
be either accepting or rejecting the given inquiry. The information comes from attributes
associated with various entities such as subject, object, and relationship. These entities are
related to the inquiry. This means that the inquiry determines which entities must be reached
and which attributes must be read. Beyond the attributes, appropriate policies, which defined
by subject or object, and related to the inquiry, must be reached.
Regarding the main elements of the proposed model, the following entities existing in the
model will be recognized:
● Accessing user, controlling user, and supervisor are all instances of the subject class.
● Target user and target resource are both instances of the object class.
● Several relationships are instances of the relationship type class.
● Environment condition is an instance of the environment condition class.
● Several actions are instances of the action class.
The remainder of this chapter provides a comprehensive explanation for each item existing in
the proposed model.
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3.5

Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Model Components
Figure 3 shows the PBAAC comprehensive model.

Figure 3- PBAAC model Components
The following listed items explain components of the PBAAC model.
● A set of relationships includes all types of relationships that may exist among entities. As the
matter of fact, relationship type defines the characteristics of connections between subjects,
objects, and subjects to objects.
A set R= {r1, r2,…….., rn , rˉ¹1, rˉ¹2,…….., rˉ¹n ,rˉ²1,rˉ²2,……,rˉ²n} represents the various
relationship types existing in the proposed model such as “friend” or “parent”. Relationship
type may have different characteristics such as:
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o Symmetric: A relationship r (e.g. ri ϵ R) is symmetric, if both parties are related under the
same relationship. In other words, if x relates to y under a relationship r, and r is a
symmetric relationship, then y relates to x under the same relationship. So, for two
entities, like x and y, if r is symmetric relation and x relates to y under r, y will relate to x
under r.
Regarding the general definition for symmetric relation, it is rewritten in the proposed
model as follows:
r is a symmetric relation if ∃ x, y and x-----:r-----> y then y------:r------> x.
For representing a symmetric relation r in the proposed model, rˉ¹ is added to the set of
relationship types. Hence, r, rˉ¹ ϵ R is presented to show that r is a symmetric relationship.
For instance, “friend” relationship type is a symmetric relationship. If Alice is Bob’s
friend, so Bob is Alice’s friend. Hence if r represents “friend”, and r ϵ R ⋀ rˉ¹ ϵ R, the
model indicates that this relationship type (i.e. r) is a symmetric relationship.
o Transitive: A relationship r (e.g. ri ϵ R) is transitive, if x relates to y under the relationship
r, and y relates to z under the relationship r, so x relates to z under the relationship r. This
relation can be shown as follows: r is a relation between x, y, and z. If r is transitive
relation and x relates to y under r and y relates to z under r, x will relate to z under r.
Based on the general definition for transitive relation, it is rewritten in the proposed
model as follows:
r is a transitive relation if ∃ x, y, z and as x----:r----> y ⋀ y----:r----> z then x---:r----> z.
For representing transitive relation r in the proposed model, rˉ² is added to the set of
relationship types. Hence, r, rˉ² ϵ R is presented to show that r is a transitive relationship.
For instance, relationship “manager” is a transitive relationship, if r identifies “manager”
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relationship, and rˉ² is added to the set of relationship type. (e.g. rˉ² ϵ R). For example, if
Jill is Joe’s manager and Joe is Bob’s manager, Jill is Bob’s manager as well. Hence if r ϵ
R ⋀ rˉ² ϵ R, it shows that the relationship type (i.e. r) is a transitive relationship type.
It is obvious that some relationship types are neither symmetric nor transitive, like
“teacher” relationship type. Hence, if r identifies “teacher” and r ϵ R, rˉ¹ ∉ R ⋀ rˉ² ∉ R.
In the work presented in this dissertation, it is required to keep information for every
relationship type. This information, called relationship metadata, stores several properties
related to relationship type. Table 2 represents the relationship types metadata.
Relationship Type Symbol

Symmetric Symbol

Transitive Symbol

friend

frnd

frnd ˉ¹

Not Exist

manager

mngr

Not Exist

mngr ˉ²

teacher

tchr

Not Exist

Not Exist

Table 2- Relationship Type Metadata
Because the entire social network uses this information, this information is restored into
repository of the supervisor. Consequently, the supervisor is the owner of the relationship
metadata.
Providing a compound object in the social network requires determining relationships
between compound objects (i.e. container objects) and simple objects (i.e. contained objects).
This is true since sometimes deleting a part of the object may affect the existence of the
whole object. Unified Modeling Language (UML) defines two relationship types to present
relationships between container and contained object; those are aggregation and composition
relationship. Under the aggregation or composition concept, deleting the container may or
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may not affect the existence of contained objects. Unlike the general definition for
aggregation and composition relationship, it is required in the proposed model to show that
deleting the contained object may or may not affect the existence of the container. Hence,
two relationship types are defined to work in reverse direction compared to aggregation and
composition relationship. The two relationship types will be called reverse aggregation and
reverse composition. The following describes a brief definition for aggregation, reverse
aggregation, composition, and reverse composition. Furthermore, it will be explained how
erasing of container impacts on the contained objects and vice versa:
o Aggregation relation denotes that if the compound resource is deleted, the simple
resource will stay alive. This relation represents a part-whole or part-of relationship.
Aggregation may happen when a class is a collection or a container of other classes, and
the contained classes do not have a strong dependency on the container. The contents of
the contained will not be automatically destroyed when the container vanishes [88]. The
following example shows two classes: printer as container and papers as contained class.
Deleting the printer does not cause a deletion of the papers. Figure 4 shows the UML
notation for aggregation.

Figure 4 – Aggregation Relationship
o Reverse aggregation relation denotes that if the simple resource is deleted, the
compounded resource will stay alive. For instance, if papers are deleted, printer will still
exist. Therefore, a new notation needs to be defined for reverse aggregation relation.
Figure 5 shows this new notation.
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Figure 5 – Reverse Aggregation Relationship
o Composition relation, unlike the aggregation, denotes that if the compound resource is
removed, the simple resource(s) will not exist anymore. Composition usually has a strong
dependency between instances of the container class and instances of the contained
classes, i.e. if the container is destroyed, normally every instance of the contained will be
destroyed as well [88]. For instance, let us consider Folder (container) and Files
(contained). Files are included in Folder, so Files do not exist separately from a Folder. If
the folder is removed, the files will be removed also. Figure 6 shows the UML notation
for composition.

Figure 6 – Composition Relationship
o Reverse composition relation denotes that if the simple resource is removed, the
compound resource will not exist anymore. For instance, if a book includes one chapter,
deleting that chapter causes deletion of the whole book. A new notation needs to be
defined for reverse composition relation. Figure 7 shows this notation.

Figure 7 – Reverse Composition Relationship
Moreover, the relationship between a user and their belonging resources may be defined in
terms of the ownership status that will be described in the next item.
o Ownership defines a relationship between owner and associated assets. In this model,
three types of ownership will be determined, namely FullOwner, PartiallOwner, and
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CollectedBy. As the names imply, if a user is the owner of an entire object, the user is the
only owner of that object and the user is the only one able to govern the object. If a user
is the owner of part of an object, the user is able to define policy only to control that part
of the object. In other words, a rule which defines who is eligible for doing an operation
on an object is accomplished by evaluating other rules associated with other part(s) of
objects owned by other user(s). If a user is not the owner of the object fully or partially,
that user is a collector of that object and may not be able to govern the object.
● A supervisor, who is the administrator of the social network, may have one or more attributes
called supervisor attribute (SPA). Each supervisor attribute stores a part of the supervisor’s
information, like name or unique ID. Table 3 represents how supervisor’s attributes are
stored in the supervisor’s repository.
Attribute Name

Attribute Value

Name

Major_Supervisor

Unique ID

SpUser1
Table 3 - Supervisor’s Attribute

The supervisor defines general policies to manage all actions arisen on the entire social
network and then stores them into its repository. Repository saves rules, which are the
converted formats of policies. Rules may be simple or complex. Rest of this chapter provides
more explanation for simple and complex rules. It should be pointed out that every rule has
four parts, such as subject part, action part, object part, and condition part where subject or
object part can be nested. The following structure is suggested for saving both types of rules
(i.e. simple or complex), like:
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o Rule#: this field stores a unique Id attached to the rule.
o Rule Type: this field stores the type of the rule, “S” for simple, or “C” for complex rule.
o Subject Part: this field stores subject part of the rule. If the rule is complex and the
subject is nested, the nested part of the subject is saved in the next several rows.
o Action Part: this field saves the action of the rule.
o Object Part-Target Resource/ Target User: this field stores the target resource or target
user of object part of the rule. If this rule is complex and the target resource/user part is
nested, the nested part of the target resource/user is saved in the next one or more rows.
o Object Part-Controlling User: this field stores the resource owner of the rule. If this rule
is complex and the controlling user part is nested, the nested part of the controlling user is
saved in the next several row(s).
o Condition Part-Time: this field saves the time of the environment condition.
o Condition Part-Location: this field saves the location of the environment condition.
o Date & Time: this field saves the date and time when the rule was fed into social
network.
o Order: this field saves level of the nested part, in case there exists multi nested part.
o Related To: if the original rule is complex, this field determines the current row is the
nested part of either the subject or the object identified in the row before.
For instance, the supervisor stores a rule to protect all repositories associated with users,
which this means each user is allowed to access to his repositories and no other users’
repositories. Hence, the supervisor defines “only one can access to its repositories”. The rule
will be generated like “< (∀ ua), Ac(action: access), (∀tr (name: repository) ∀ uc (name:
_self)) >” . This rule is saved in the supervisor’s repository. Comprehensive explanation of
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how rule is generated will be provided in the NLP phase section. Table 4 shows this as
follows:
Column

Value

Rule#

Rule1

Rule Type

“S” = Simple

Subject Part

∀ ua

Action Part

Ac (name:access)

Object Part- Target ∀ tr (name: repository)
Resource/
Target
User
Object
Part- ∀ uc (name: _self)
Controlling User
Condition Part-Time
Condition
Location

Part-

Date & Time

5/12/2016-9:00

Order

0

Related To

Not Defined
Table 4 – Supervisor’s Repository

Under the target resource definition, another example shows how a complex rule is saved
into this structure.
Every permission for gaining access to a resource is done under the supervisor’s surveillance,
meanwhile supervisor and resource owner are able to enforce control access to that resource.
In general, rules that protect a particular resource shall not conflict with other rules that
protect the same resource. If there exists some conflict among rules, the proposed method
must resolve this issue. The solution for recognizing and removing this conflict is part of the
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decision engine which will be explained in detail in the request engine section of this chapter.
This solution may be developed based on three criteria as follows:
o Timestamp: this item represents that conflict elimination is performed based on the date
and time when rules are fed into the social network. It defines which rule must be
considered. Choosing rule either recently or formerly is defined on the social network.
o Rule domination: this item represents which rule overrides other rule(s).
o Dominant: this item represents who dominates other users.
Because of keeping these criteria on the supervisor’s repository, choosing one or more
criteria for removing conflict is noticeably dynamic. Table 5 keeps these three criteria as
follows. As Table 5 shows, only timestamp is used for solving the conflict issue for all
examples mentioned in this chapter.
Criteria

Enabled/disabled

Timestamp

Recently added

Rule domination

Disabled

Dominant

Disabled
Table 5 - Removing Confrontation Criteria

The supervisor is responsible to define which rule overrides other rules, and who dominates
who as well. Tables 6 and 7 show this definition.
Dominant Rule

Submissive Rules

Rule #

List of rules which are dominated by
Table 6 – Rule Domination

Dominant User

Submissive Users

User ID

List of users which are dominated by
Table 7 – User Domination
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The supervisor is responsible for maintaining a large amount of data such as environment
condition and metadata. Later, more explanation for environment condition will be provided.
Metadata may include information about the relationship among elements as described
thoroughly in the relationship section. Moreover, different types of ownership were described
in this section. The supervisor stores relationship and ownership type to utilize social
network for adding more relationship types, in case of users need to define new relationship
or ownership types. For instance, if there are three relationship types in the social network
such as “teacher”, “manager”, and “colleague”, the supervisor keeps them as shown in Table
8.
Relationship Type

Mnemonic

Symmetric Mnemonic

Transitive Mnemonic

Colleague

colg

colg ˉ¹

Not Defined

Manager

mngr

Not Defined

mngr ˉ²

Teacher

tchr

Not Defined

Not Defined

Table 8 - Supervisor Repository for Relationship
Moreover, supervisor stores definition for symmetric and transitive relationship categories as
shown in Table 9. Using this table, it is possible to add more relationship type categories in
future.
Relationship Property Definition
Symmetric

r is a symmetric relation if ∃ x , y and x ⥤ y then y ⥤ x.

Transitive

r is a transitive relation if ∃ x , y, z and x ⥤ y ⋀ y ⥤ z then x ⥤ z.
Table 9 - Supervisor Repository for Relationship Property

Table 10 shows the stored data for representing and defining ownership. Whenever users
create a new ownership type, they must determine a definition for it. Afterwards, the decision
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engine is able to process and understand this relationship. Decision engine can use this
relationship during processing a received request.
Ownership
Type

Mnemonic

Definition

FullOwner

Fown

Determines that resource owner is able to control the entire
resource

PartiallOwner

Pown

Determines that resource owner is able to control the
specific part of the resource

CollectedBy

Clct

Determines that resource owner is not able to control the
entire resource
Table 10 – Supervisor Repository for Ownership

The supervisor is also responsible to store definitions for adjacent and trusted users that are
used in evaluating requests. For instance, the supervisor defines that adjacent users must have
at least one direct connection with the source users, and trusted users must get a trustee score
more than 80%. Table 11 represents how data are stored for this example. More description
is provided in the rest of the document.
Type

Definition

Adjacent user

∀ SourceUsr, DestinationUsr ϵ SN, ∃ r ϵ R:
SourceUsr------:r+1------> DestinationUsr

Trusted user

∀ SourceUsr, DestinationUsr ϵ SN, ∃ r ϵ R:
SourceUsr ------:r+*------> DestinationUsr,
Min (∏ ωri) >=80 , W = {ωi | is a weight attached to each
connection in a path}
Table 11 – Adjacent and Trusted User Definition

Furthermore, the supervisor stores two tables, which are used to determine the parts of
speech of all words included in a policy or an inquiry statement or words that may be used in
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the future. One of them is keyword table which includes words and related parts of speech
for every possible word. For instance, the following table shows a part of the keyword table.
Each row saves a word which may exist in a sentence.
Row# Word

Parts of Speech (Major)

Parts of Speech (Minor)

1

Alice

Noun

Subject

2

Poke

Verb

Main

3

Someone

Pronoun-indefinitive

Subject

4

Whom

Pronoun-relative

Subject

5

Only

Determiner

6

Me

Pronoun

7

To

Preposition

8

Documents

Noun-concrete

Object

Object

Table 12 – Keyword Table
The word-entity table maps words in a policy/inquiry into social network entities. Table 13
presents this mapping table. Tables 12 and 13 will be used by decision engine, specifically in
the NLP phase. More information is provided in the decision engine section.
Row# Ref from Keyword Table

Entity Type

Entity

1

1

Subject

Accessing user

2

2

Action

Action

3

6

Object

Controlling user

4

8

Object

Target Resource

Table 13 – Word-entity Table
The supervisor could generate an inquiry for performing an action against an object. This
feature will be part of future work and therefore will not be discussed in this dissertation.
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Moreover, a supervisor is an entity to which the other entities are connected. As seen in the
Figure 3, these relationship types may be “HasMember”, “HasAsset”, “ControlledBy”, and
“ControlData”.
● An accessing user who has a role as a subject is a member of the social network and is able to
generate an inquiry for accessing an object (e.g. target user or target resource). Almost all
access requests are initiated by the accessing users. Accessing users have one or more
attributes, which are called Accessing User Attribute (AUA); each attribute stores a part of
accessing users’ information such as first name, last name, birthdate, and so on in order to
provide unique identification information. The structure of the table used for storing
accessing user attribute is the same as the structure defined for storing supervisor’s attributes.
Later in this chapter, the attribute will be described. It will also be explained why attributes
are defined under specific circumstances and how attributes will be used.
● A controlling user who has a role as a subject, controls all accesses to related resource(s) by
defining policies. These policies will be transformed to rules and stored in a repository of the
controlling user’s resource. Structure of the table used for storing controlling user policies is
the same as the structure of the table defined for storing supervisor’s rules. As can be
implied, regulations for accessing to target resources could be configured by the controlling
user policies and attribute(s). Hence, controlling user carries one or more attributes to store
associated individual information. These attributes are called Controlling User Attribute
(CUA). The structure of the table used for storing controlling user attribute is the same as the
structure of the table defined for storing supervisor’s attribute. Note that, in this document,
the terms owner and controlling user are used interchangeably.
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● A target user is a user whom other users request an access of or establish a relationship. Since
target users govern all corresponding information by themselves, target users require to
define policies to manage given requests. This policy is called Target User Policy (TUP) and
stored in a repository belonging to the target users. The structure of the table used for storing
target user’s rules is the same as the structure of the table defined for storing supervisor’s
rules. Besides, in order to being recognized by the system, target users carry several
attributes to make unique identification information called Target User Attribute (TUA). The
structure of the table used for storing target user attribute is the same as the structure of the
table defined for storing supervisor’s attribute. The target user has a role as an object and
might inherited some functionality from the subject.
● A target resource is managed by a controlling user who is the resource owner. Unlike the
model defined by Cheng et al. [83], the target resource keeps the policies to manage all
access requests, although these policies are defined by its owner. This group of policies is
called Target Resource Policy (TRP). The structure of the table used for storing target
resource rules is the same as the structure of the table defined for storing supervisor’s rules.
If a controlling user defines a policy to protect belonging photos, it might be like: “accessing
user AA wants to share her photo to users who share their photos to her.”, so the rule might
be like: “∀ ua (∃ ua (name: AA), Ac (name: access), ∀ tr (name: photo) ∀ uc), Ac (action:
access), ∀ tr (name:photo) ∀ uc (name:AA)”. Table 14 shows part of repository associated to
resource (i.e. photos), which is an asset of user AA.
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Record 1:
Column

Value

Rule#

Rule1

Rule Type

“C” = Complex

Subject Part

∀ ua (∃ua (name: AA), Ac (name: access), ∀ tr
(name:photo) ∃uc)

Action Part

Ac (action: access)

Object Part – Target Resource/
Target User

∀ tr (name:photo)

Object Part – Controlling User

∃ uc (name:AA)

Condition Part-Time
Condition Part-Location
Date & Time

5/12/2016-9:00

Order

0

Related To

N/A
Table 14 – Target Resource Repository
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Record 2:
Column

Value

Rule#

Rule1

Rule Type

“S” = Simple

Subject Part

∃ ua (name: AA)

Action Part

Ac (name: access)

Object Part – Target Resource/
Target User

∀ tr (name:photo)

Object Part – Controlling User

∃ uc

Condition Part-Time
Condition Part-Location
Date & Time

5/12/2016-9:00

Order

1

Related To

Subject
Table 14 – Target Resource Repository (cont.)

Target resource carries one or more attributes, which are called Target Resource Attribute
(TRA), such as a name of resource, resource owner, and an identification number, which
shows the uniqueness of that resource in the social network. The structure of the table used
for storing target resource attributes is the same as the structure of the table defined for
storing supervisor’s attribute. The target resource has a role as object. The rest of the
document resource and target resource is used interchangeably.
The proposed model supports two types of resources: simple and compound resources. The
simple resource is only one-unit resource and does not include other resources. Therefore, to
grant or refuse permission to access the simple resource, only checking the policies kept by
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that resource will be adequate. Although in some cases, the social network needs to look up
the supervisor policies which confine accessing to resources. In contrast, the compound
resource is derived from other resources, and this might be controlled by the supervisor or by
another controlling user who are fully or partially owners of a compound resource. In the
former case, the resource is under the supervision of the social network, so access to that
resource will be computed based on the accessing policies defined by supervisor and the
accessing policies defined by the controlling user of each contributing resource. The latter
case is similar to the former case except that the controlling user of the compounded resource
might have a resource which is one of the contributing resource. This controlling user is also
allowed to define the control access policies for the compound resource. As a result, a
request to access the compound resource must be checked against several controlling users’
access policies and supervisor policies.
As shown earlier, the relationship between the compound resource and its contributing
resources may be reverse composition or reverse aggregation. Every controlling user or every
owner of contributing resources are allowed to determine the type of relationship. This means
that the owner of the contributing resource may have a policy which determines deleting the
contributing resource, the compound resource will either be affected or not. For instance,
based on Figure 8, suppose that resource 1 is a document which is a user guide for software
AA. This document includes three chapters, two of them help users to log into the software
application and work with the different screens and menus existing in the system. These two
chapters are essential meaning that existence of the document is completely dependent upon
the existence of those chapters and if one of those two chapters has been deleted, the
document will be deleted as well. Another one chapter of the document is not essential. This
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chapter provides the acknowledgement of the document that the document is still alive with
or without the existence of this chapter, so deleting this chapter does not affect the entire
document. In Figure 8, resource1 or document is contributed of resource2, resource3 and
resource4, which these are chapters of the document. Relationship type between resource1
and resource2, as well as resource1 and resource4 are reverse composition because resource2
and resource4 are the fundamental chapters. Resource3 and resource1 are connected under
the relationship type reverse aggregation, which means resource 3 is not the fundamental
chapter.

Figure 8- compound resource
● Attributes are attached to an entity to define the entity uniquely, so that entity can be
distinguished in the social network. The following explains definition of attributes in each
class.
o S, O, R, A, and E are subjects, objects, relationships, actions and environmental
conditions respectively. In our model, subject may be accessing user, controlling user, or
supervisor. Object may be target user or target resource.
o SAk (1<= k <= K), OAl (1<= l <= L), RAm (1<= m <= M), AAp (1<= p <= P), EAn (1<= n
<= N) are defined attributes for subjects, objects, relationships, actions, and
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environmental conditions respectively. The number of attributes attached to each entity
may change during the life time of the social network.
o A represents the set of attributes for each entity, and Ai represents one attribute of each
set. Each attribute encompasses the name and the value of the attribute, like: Ai = (Ni: Vi).
o Attr(S), Attr(O), Attr(R), Attr(A), and Attr(E) are set of attributes assigned with subject,
object, relationship, action, and environmental condition respectively.
Attr(S) ⊆ SA1x SA2x …… x SAk
Attr(O) ⊆ OA1 x OA2 x …… x OAl
Attr(R) ⊆ RA1 x RA2 x …… x RAm
Attr(A) ⊆ AA1 x AA2 x …… x AAp
Attr(E) ⊆ EA1 x EA2 x …… x EAn
● Environment condition includes data generated by a social network. This data, such as time
and location, is changed rapidly related to conditions existing in the social network.
Environment condition provides information about the current date and time as well as the
location. Table15 shows environment information.
Type

Value

Date & Time

Current date and time

Location

Current location
Table 15 - Environment condition

● Actions representing operations (e.g. read, or edit) or accesses are initiated by the accessing
user. As mentioned previously, an action is an entity of the proposed model and is almost
initiated by a subject in the social network. The following table presents the actions covered
by the proposed model.
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Action

Description

Access

Accessing to a target user

Read

Reading information or resource

Write or Edit

Writing or editing information or resource

Delete

Deleting information or resource

Create

Adding new information’s item or adding a part of resource associated
with a target resource

Copy

Coping information or resource

Execute objects

Performing a function against a target resource

Grant permission Accessing user is allowed to give permission to another accessing user
to someone else in order to perform an operation on a particular object
to run an
operation on an
object
Table 16 - Operations
● Different connections among the elements in Figure 3 may represent relationship, access
request, attached policy, and attached attribute.
o Relationship which has different types may connect supervisor to accessing user,
supervisor to target user, supervisor to controlling user, supervisor to target resource,
accessing user to target user, accessing user to controlling user, controlling user to target
resource or repository, and target user to repository.
o Access request is created when an accessing user creates an inquiry to access a target user
or to run an action on a target resource.
o Attached policy connects policies to an entity such as target user, target resource, or
supervisor.
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o Attached attribute connects attributes to an entity such as accessing user, target user, or
relationship.
As mentioned before, five entities such as subject, object, action, relationship, and environmental
condition have their own properties which store attributes; the first two are able to store rules in
an associated repository. Attributes offer individual information of entity such as name, and
unique ID, and rules are the transformed statements of policies defined by the subject or the
object. It is required to define policy specification language for transforming policies to rules,
accordingly. This model, unlike the model introduced by Cheng at al. [83], consists of subjectto-subject, object-to-object, and subject-to-object relationships in the social network, although
this capture uses subject-to-object relationships for authorization purpose.
3.6

Graph Model
As shown in Figure 3, the social network can be indicated as a directed labeled graph.

Generally, a graph is a collection of vertices which are connected by edges. There are two types
of graphs, directed graphs and undirected graphs. Edges in a directed graph have arrows and
each arrow only goes in one direction. Edges in an undirected graph does not have arrows and
does not present any specific direction. In other words, a graph is a general data structure for
storing related data which nodes denote objects or subjects and edges represent connections
among nodes.
The graph of a social network may be modeled as a G = <N, E, Ʃ, W> where
● N is union of a finite set of subjects (S) and a finite set of objects (O) in the system,
represented as nodes on the graph. Each node carries one or more attributes.
● Ʃ is a finite set of relationship types, represented as labels for connection on the graph.
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● W is a number that may be attached to a relationship connecting a subject to another subject
or object. This number shows a percentage a user can trust other users to give them a
particular permission on the social network.
● E ⊆N × N× Ʃ × W denotes graph edges and may be a set of existing connection, like:
subject→ subject, subject→object, and object→object relationships.
Figure 9 represents a graph for a model which has been defined based on the ABAC model
and the PBAC model.

Figure 9 –Graph Model
3.7

Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Method
Before starting to describe the PBAAC method, considering an example which shows how

someone can sign up, be a member of a group, and make a connection with other users on the
social network would be helpful. Before starting the example, it’s worth mentioning that for
extracting information from the graph, we use several functions which will be described in
chapter 6.
Example: if one signs up to a social network, one fills out a form and enters personal
information which is required for the social network’s authentication. Afterwards, the social
network creates a credential for that user. According to the graph concept that we use to store the
entities, behind the scene, the social network creates a node for the new user and attaches one or
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more properties that keep data of attributes, such as first name, last name, and date of birth. The
user can define a membership in an existing group or create a new group just by choosing a name
for the new group and defining oneself as a member of that group. Technically, a group of nodes
is defined by a label which is considered as an attribute of the entity. Labels are used to classify
nodes. Later, we will show that labels may be used to define which groups and under which
circumstances they are allowed to do an operation on an object. Meanwhile, we define functions
determining who and under which conditions they are allowed to do an operation on an object.
As we mentioned before, in the proposed model we define a supervisor who has a direct
relationship with other entities in the social network. The following descriptions explain the
entire process of the proposed model.
Description 1: supervisor (SpUser) has a relationship as “HasMember” with other users such
as accessing user, target user, and controlling user on the social network (SN). The following
shows this:
∀ User ϵ SN, ∃ SpUser ϵ SN: SpUser -----:HasMember-----> User
Establishing a relationship among other users is possible and it is established when a user
sends a request to another user for creating a specific relationship type. If the receiver accepts the
request, the relationship will be established; otherwise that relationship will not be created. It is
obvious that several different relationships may connect a user with another user.
∃ User1, User2ϵ SN, ∃ r1 ϵ Relationship: User1 -----:r -----> User2
i

For instance, two users might settle on a relationship as friend and as colleague.
Description 2: Users can establish a relationship with their own resources. As described
previously, there are three different relationship types between a user and associated resources,
like FullOwner, PartiallOwner, and CollectedBy. The following shows this definition:
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∀ Resource ϵ Asset, ∃ User ϵ SN:
User ---------:FullOwner-----------> Resource ⋁ User ---------:PartiallOwner----------> Resource ⋁
User --------:CollectedBy--------> Resource
Asset is a set of resources existing in the social network. This means that all resources
existing on the social network belong to a group called asset.
Description 3: Resources belonging to a user are assets of the social network. Therefore, the
supervisor has a relation with resources. This relationship type is called “HasAsset”. The
following shows this definition:
∀ Resource ϵ Asset, ∃ User ϵ SN Resource € User, ∃ SpUser ϵ SN:
SpUser -----: HasAsset-----> Resource
Description 4: Environment condition has a relationship with the supervisor. This
relationship type is called “ControlledBy”. The following shows this definition:
∀ Environment Condition ϵ SN, ∃ SpUser ϵ SN:
SpUser -----:controlledBy-----> Environment Condition
Description 5: Resources existing in a social network and associated with a controlling user
may include other simple resources owned by other users or may be a simple resource owned by
just one user. Previously, we described these two types of resources. The following shows if a
resource composes of other simple resources: (assume there are n resources and m users in the
social network)
∃ res1, res2, …., resi, resn ϵ Assets, resn ∁ (res1⋀ res2⋀….⋀ resi),
∃ User1, User2, ….., Usermϵ SN, res1€ User1, res2€ User2………, resi € Userj, resn € Userm, i<=n-1,
j<=m-1
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(resi -----------:RevAggregation-------------> resn ⋁ resi ------------:RevComposition------------> resn)
Types of relationships exist between object and subject were defined before. It is obvious
that the User can be supervisor, meaning, resn may have relationship with supervisor rather than
having relationship with an ordinary user.
Description 6: Users are able to define policies on behalf of their adjacent or trusted users.
Regarding the definition of adjacent and trusted users, they have at least one directed or
undirected relationship with the accessing user. If a directed connection exists between these two
sides, the user will be allowed to define policies to take control of information and resources
belonging to the adjacent or trusted user.
The supervisor defines general policies for the social network. The policies defined by the
supervisor should not conflict with the policies defined by other users. Also policies defined by a
user should not conflict with the policies defined by other users. As a matter of fact, if there are
conflicts between policies defined by various entities, the decision engine who collects all
policies contributing in an accessing request and generates the result is responsible to recognize
these conflicts and solves these conflicts. The proposed model defines an efficient function,
which is a part of the request engine, as solution for this problem. The function assigns a priority
to each rule which is transformed format of a policy. This priority identifies a rule having higher
priority overrides other rules having lower priority. This priority may be defined by timestamp or
by other criteria were defined before. By comparing data attached to each rule, a process of the
request engine choses the most appropriate rules for making decisions. Later in the request
engine section, this function will be comprehensively explained.
The accessing user generates an inquiry to do an action against information or resources that
are owned by another user. Using notation, the following shows this:
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∃ Accessing user ϵ SN, Target user ϵ SN, Target resource ϵ Assets:
Accessing user ⊕ (Target user ⋁ Target resource)
This request may be accepted or rejected in terms of the target user or target resource access
control policies. Sometimes supervisor’s policies are included to compute whether or not giving
permission to requestors.
As explained before, several parameters such as user’s attribute, resource’s attribute, access
control policy, environment condition, adjacent and trusted users are used to determine who is
allowed to access a resource. Up to this point, all parameters required in the proposed model to
compute a received request will be defined.
Users define policies to protect their individual information and resources. All policies are
defined in the English language. In order to store these policies into the social network, these
policies must be transformed to a format, which is understandable, by the application and
working with that transformed format is much easier than working with the format of a policy
presenting in natural language. A transformation engine creates the simple format of those
policies and stores them as rules on the social network. Rules are stored in the properties of the
subject or object. The transformation engine will be covered in decision engine section of this
document.
Description 7: In order to define the adjacent user with a particular relationship type, an
algorithm has been defined to count the number of the specified relationship between the target
user or controlling user in one side and accessing user on the other side. The following shows
this:
Connections = ∑ ri , R={ ri | is a particular relationship type between source and target user,
or source and controlling user}
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If number of connections is equal to the number determined the adjacent user which defined
by supervisor, then the destination user is the adjacent user of the source user. Figure 10 shows
an example; an adjacent user is one who has less than or equal to two connections with source
user. In this figure Alice is a source user, so Bob and John are the adjacent friend for Alice, but
Liz, Sue, and Ben are not.

Figure 10 – Adjacent user
For defining who the trusted user is, a weight has been assigned with each relationship. By
knowing the accessing user and the target user, or controlling user, the graph is traversed for all
paths connecting the accessing user to the target user or controlling user; for each acyclic path
the trust value will be computed. For making result and by following conservative approach, the
trust value of each path will be compared and the minimum value will be selected as result. The
following formula shows this:
valuep = ∏ ωi , W = {ωi | is a weight attached to each connection in a path}
result = min {valuep | p is a acyclic path connects source to destination}
The result identifies whether the destination user is a trusted user or not. Figure 11 shows all
paths existing between Hana and Al; each connection has its weight. With regards to this figure,
there are two paths between Hana and Al. The first path which starts from Hana and ends with
Al (Hana→Ted→Ava→Al) gives us the 72% trust and the second path which starts from Hana
and ends with Al (Hana→Pat→Al) gives us 16% trust. Due to following conservative approach
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for defining the trusted user, by comparing two numbers, the result is 16% which tells us Hana
should not trust Al.

Figure 11 – trusted graph
3.8

Decision Engine
Decision engine is a principal part of the proposed model. As shown in Figure 12, the

decision engine is a process standing between subject (e.g. accessing user) and object (e.g. target
user or target resource). At first sight, the decision engine receives a policy or an inquiry as an
input and converts it into a well-formed format. If the received sentence is a policy, the decision
engine stores the output (i.e. rule) into a repository associated with the one who generates the
policy, otherwise the decision engine evaluates the request converted format of an inquiry, and
either accepts or rejects the request. The decision engine consists of two major engines, the
transformation engine and the request engine. The decision engine accomplishes its task through
the combination of transformation and request engines. Figure 12 provides a simple diagram of
the decision engine.
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Figure 12 – Decision Engine
The transformation engine, as its name implies, uses natural language processing technique
to generate an appropriate and efficient format for representing a sentence provided in the
English language. An input sentence might be either a policy or an inquiry fed into the social
network by one who needs to protect associated resource(s) or to access other resource(s)
belonging to someone else. The appropriate format of the output generated by the transformation
engine is called well-formed format. If the input is a policy, the well-formed format is called
rule, and if the input is an inquiry, the well-formed format is called request. Under the
transformation engine section, the workflow and the whole process of this engine will be
explained thoroughly.
The request engine is a recipient of a request generated by the transformation engine. By
gathering pertinent knowledge, which is coming from rules and attributes attached to entities
interrelating with the request, the request engine evaluates the request and might be able to come
to a decision in order to either accept or reject the request. Under the request engine section,
more information of the entire process will be provided.
3.8.1 Transformation Engine
All policies enforcing access control and all inquiries representing request for accessing or
doing an operation on resources are fed into social networks in a natural language (e.g. English
language). Hence, by employing a natural language, users are able to define access control
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policies that secure their assets, and they can generate inquiries to get permission to access a
resource belonging to other users. This facility empowers users to feed their commands into
social networks in a convenient way and enables users to protect their information and resources
from unauthorized access effortlessly. On the other hand, social networking software
applications cannot understand these commands. These commands are understandable by
software application, providing they will be transformed into a simple format which is called a
well-formed format.
In this work, the transformation engine converts a complex format into a well-formed format.
Due to consistency between the formats generated by the transformation engine and the general
definition of a well-formed format [89, 90]. It is possible to offer an appropriate notation for
describing rules and queries with this format. This newly generated format is remarkably
compatible with the syntactic structure of a policy or an inquiry. This means that words in a
policy or an inquiry are appearing with an order such as subject, verb, and object. The syntactic
order of elements existing in a rule or a request is as subject, action, and object as well. We
assume that verbs in a policy or an inquiry and actions in a rule or a request are the same.
Regarding the well-formed format, rules or requests are generated under the following format,
which is a list with four elements: (subject, action, object, condition).
This format may be presented by a tree structure where root presents the action. The leaves
represent the subject, the object, and the condition of the expression. The subject may represent
the accessing user, the adjacent user, or the trustworthy user, and the object may represent the
target user or the target resource. Target resource usually is followed by corresponding
controlling user. The condition represents the environmental condition. Figure 13 shows this
tree.
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Figure 13 – Rule Tree
Due to the complexity of a policy, subject and object of a rule could be a well-formed format
as well. This format is called a nested well-formed format and rules may look as follows:
((subject, action, object, condition), action, (subject, action, object, condition), condition).
The tree for representing the nested well-formed format is shown in Figure 14. In this tree,
the root represents an action. the left most leaf is a subtree presenting all entities related to
subject part, and the middle leaf is a subtree presenting all entities related to object part. The
right most left is condition. Under this structure, all middle nodes show actions or relationships,
and all leaves my show accessing users, adjacent users, trusted users, target user, target resource,
controlling user, and environment condition. Resource owner is attached to the its own target
resource.

Figure 14 – Nested Rule Tree
In order to have a well-formed format, three criteria, listed in the following, must be met.
● Each list must be opened and subsequently closed
● Each element may be properly nested so it does not overlap
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● Each element represents a subject followed by another element representing an action, and
this will be followed by an element representing an object. Occasionally, this format may be
ended with conditions.
Our model obeys these three requirements to generate the well-formed format [90]. By
collaboration of various functions defined in the transformation engine, this engine receives an
input and then converts it into a well-formed format.
Figure 15 shows a basic picture of the transformation engine. Based on the nature of an input,
inputs are categorized into two groups as follows:
●

Policy: it safeguards individual data resources against unjustified access. Policy is fed into
the transformation engine, and then it is converted to a well-formed format called rule.

●

Inquiry: it denotes a request for doing an action against data or resource. Inquiry is fed into
the transformation engine, and then it is converted into a well-formed format called request.

Figure 15 – Transformation Engine
At first glance, the output of the transformation engine would be a rule or a request. The rest
of this section explains, in details, how a rule and a request will be generated.
The transformation engine is assumed to complete the conversion process in two phases due to
having a robust engine. The two phases are described as follows:
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● First phase: this phase generates a list of words existing in the input. Each word is followed
by information describing that word. Thus, this process extracts words from input; these
words carry the gist of the input. The type of received input has been defined when it was
created by subject or object such as accessing user, target user, or controlling user, so the
category of input is completely distinguishable by the transformation engine. This phase is
started by performing the Natural Language Parsing (NLP) process.
NLP receives input, and then distinguishes all words from the input sentence and adds
grammatical information to every word. In order to achieve this goal, NLP uses three
processes called tokenize, keyword recognition, and knowledge extraction processes.
o Tokenize process provides a list of all terms or words existing in the input. Tokenize
process distinguishes words from a given sentence by finding one or more spaces
separating these words. This process ignores symbols such as “,”, “:”, “;”, and
parenthesis. Moreover, if this process finds alphanumeric characters connected to
alphabetic characters, it separates numbers from alphabets and adds them as different
words on to the list. If numbers are surrounded by an alphabet, the numbers will be
removed from that word and only the alphabetic part will be added as one word on to the
list. These two sub-functions help to mitigate or remove any mistyped word effect.
Finally, the output of the tokenize process will be generated. This is a list of all words
existing in the input sentence. Words in this list are ordered in terms of their appearing in
the original sentence. The output might be a list as follows:
<word1, word2, word3, ……………………………., wordn>
For instance, someone defines a policy in order to secure oneself from unauthorized
access and she said “no one can poke me”. Hence, the tokenize process generates a list as:
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<no, one, can, poke, me>
o Keyword recognition process attaches some basic information into every word in the list
provided by the tokenize process. The keyword recognition process receives the list of
words from the tokenize process and searches every word in the keyword table to find out
the grammatical point which has been provided for that word in the social network. The
keyword table as shown before stores grammatical information, specifically parts of
speech, for every possible word. Previously, we described that the supervisor is
responsible for maintenance and saving information into this table stored in the repository
belonging to the supervisor. Besides, if one word of the list carries negative meaning
intrinsically like (unable), or intuitively has negative meaning (like not or no), the
negative meaning is reflected in the basic information. Every item of the list represents a
word and its related information. Hence, output of the keyword recognition process may
be a list of several elements. Each element may have a structure such as the following:
<word, (parts of speech (major), parts of speech (detail), negative or positive meaning)>
The following defines every item in this list:
✓

Word: this is a token of the input sentence.

✓

Part of speech (major): this may be noun, pronoun, verb, adverb, adjective,
conjunction, preposition, article, or determiner.

✓

Part of speech (detail): this may be possessive, objective, subjective, reflexive
pronoun, possessive adjective, possessive pronoun, auxiliary verb and main verb.

Having the example provided for the tokenize process, the keyword recognition process
generates the following list: (< no, (determiner, subject, ¬)>, < one, (noun, subject, -)>,
< can, (verb, auxiliary, -)>, < poke, (verb, main, -)>, < me, (pronoun, object, -)>)
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o Knowledge extraction process: The knowledge extraction process receives the list
generated by those processes. Sometimes, in an input sentence (i.e. policy or inquiry),
there are side by side words which are syntactically related and they altogether represent
one comprehensive concept in terms of the information extracted from each word. Hence,
the knowledge extraction process collects these words and puts them on the list as one
word and attaches proper grammatical information. Sometimes, an input sentence
includes one or more accessing users in order to access one or more several objects (i.e.
target user or target resources). In this case, the proposed method generates several rules
or queries. The number of accessing users or objects defines how many outputs will be
generated by knowledge extraction. In addition, using the word-entity table, the
knowledge extraction process maps each word in the list onto the closest entity type and
entity defined in the social network. All entities associated with the social networks are
stored in this table. Earlier, the word-entity table and its data were described.
The following shows the format of a list generated by the knowledge extraction process.
The list includes several items including a word and its own basic information which
provides remarkable knowledge for that word as follows:
<word, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative or positive meaning)>
The following describes detailed information for every item of the list:
Word: it may be a token or concatenation of more tokens of the input sentence.
Entity type: based on the definition addressed previously in this document, it may be
a subject, an object, a relationship, an action, or an environment condition.
Quantifier: this is a symbol and indicates the scope of a term or determines the
quantity to which it is attached. Two famous examples of a quantifier are “∀” which
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is a quantifier that represents “for all entities” and “∃” which is a quantifier that
represents “there exists an entity” [5].
Entity: based on the components of the proposed model defined earlier, this may be
an accessing user, a target user, a target resource, a controlling user, a relationship
type, an action type, or an environment condition.
Negative or positive meaning: this is a symbol. If the word carries negative meaning,
either explicitly or implicitly, symbol “¬ “will be used. Otherwise, symbol “-“ will be
used to show positive meaning.
Subsequently, the knowledge extraction process creates a list by collecting the items
described above. The following shows the output of this process:
{(T, X), (<word1, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative or positive meaning)>………
<wordn, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative or positive meaning)>)}
The final list includes two additional pieces of information about the input as follows:
The first variable, T, represents the date and time when the input was fed into the
social network site. It is called timestamp.
The next one, X, represents the type of input. If X in “0”, it means this input is a
policy. If X is “1”, it means this input is an inquiry.
To clarify the functionality of these processes, pursuing the following example will be
helpful. For instance, a sentence “no one can poke me” was received as a policy input by the
transformation engine at time “t1”. In order to distinguish hidden information from that input,
the tokenize process, which is part of the NLP, splits the input sentence into its constituent
words. Then the keyword recognition process defines grammatical roles for every word and
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the knowledge extraction process provides a short and clean list of words and corresponding
entities. So the output of each process for the above example may be as follows:
Output of the tokenize process may be such as: <no, one, can, poke, me>
Output of the keyword recognition process may be written as: (<no, (determiner, subject,
¬)>, <one, (noun, subject, -)>, <can, (verb, auxiliary, -)>, <poke, (verb, main, -)>, <me,
(pronounce, object, -)>)
Finally, output of the knowledge extraction may be presented as: {(t1,’0’), (<no one, (subject,
∄, accessing user, ¬)>, <poke, (action, poke, -)>, <me, (object, ∃, target user, -)>)
Within the above three processes, using ontology concepts, it is possible to create an agreedupon vocabulary for exchanging information. Ultimately, each vocabulary or word of the
input will be mapped onto a specific concept on the social network. Without any doubt,
having comprehensive information for each word of the input, decision of granting or
revoking access to an object will be more precise.
● Second phase: based on the input type received by the first phase, either a policy or an
inquiry, the transformation engine performs a rule maker or a request maker processes to
generate a rule or a request, respectively.
o Rule maker process receives a list of words and their related information of a policy and
generates a well-formed format which is a rule. Users are allowed to save their defined
rules into their rule repository. These rules will be used when the object receives inquiry
for accessing or doing an action against user’s resources. If the list generated by the
knowledge extraction includes a relationship, depending on which parts of the sentence
(i.e. subject or object or both part) include the relationship, that parts (i.e. subject part or
object part or both) may be represented in a complex format. Hence, the rule will be
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presented in a nested well-formed format meaning that the subject, object, or both may be
represented in the well-formed format as well. Based upon the object, which can be a
target user or a target resource included in the list, rule maker process generates a rule
under one of the following formats. In both formats, the accessing user may be an
adjacent or a trusted user.
✓

If the policy is protecting target user’s individual information from illegal access, the
rule may be presented as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier] environment_conditions [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)])]}- T

✓

If the policy is protecting controlling user’s resource from illegal access, the rule may
be presented as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_resource [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)] [quantifier] controlling_user [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier]
environment_conditions [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)])]}- T

o Request maker process receives a list of words and related information extracted from
inquiry input. With regards to the action existed in the list, this process generates request
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under one of the following formats. In both formats, the accessing user is an individual
user and usually attribute-name just presents the name of the accessing user.
✓

If the inquiry is doing an operation against a target user’s individual information, the
request may be presented as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier] environment_conditions [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)])]}- T

✓

If the request is doing an operation against a controlling user’s resource, the request
may be presented as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_resource [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)] [quantifier] controlling_user [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier]
environment_conditions [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)])]}- T

3.8.2 Request Engine
The request engine receives a request and makes a decision about whether or not give
permission to accessing users in order to access a particular object. Figure 16 shows a basic
picture of the request engine.
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Figure 16 – Request Engine
An accessing user generates an inquiry to access or do an operation against a target user or a
target resource. Since an inquiry for accessing a resource or information is received, the
recipient, who is given the request, should respond to that request. In order to respond to the
received inquiry, the decision engine will be performed for creating an appropriate answer for
the inquiry. As mentioned before, the first engine of the decision engine is the transformation
engine process. After performing the transformation process, the query, which is a transformed
format of the inquiry, will be delivered to the request engine. The request engine collects all
parameters playing key roles for evaluating the request and then concludes a result. The main
parameters may be accessing user’s attributes, action’s attributes, relationship’s attributes,
environment condition’ attributes, supervisor’s rules, target user’s rules, and target resource’s
rules. The request engine consists of three processes as follows:
● The first process is responsible for selecting appropriate rules from several different sets of
rules defined by entities contributing in the request, and the supervisor. This process is called
selecting rules.
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● The second process is responsible for collecting all required attributes from entities
contributing in the request, and the supervisor. Using the given request, this process
recognizes necessary parameters. This process is called selecting attributes.
● The third process is responsible for deriving result from collected information. Moreover, in
the case of arising confliction among selected rules, this process provides a solution and
chooses the most appropriate rule which either accepts or rejects the request clearly. This
process is called deriving result.
Selecting Rules
An object, a target user or a target resource, has various rules, each of which confines access
to a target user or doing an operation against a target resource based on the type of the operation,
the environment conditions’ attributes, the target user’s attributes, the target resource’s attributes,
and the accessing user’s attributes (or a group which an accessing user is a member of). One or
more rules which satisfy the request may be extracted from two different sets of rules. The two
sets of rules could be as follows:
● The first set of rules may be reached from the repository belonging to the target user or the
target resource to protect belongings against illegal access.
● The second one may be selected from a set of rules defined by the supervisor. That is defined
as general rules to dictate policies for monitoring the access to the entire social network.
This process selects rules which protect corresponding object from specific action. This
action has been mentioned in the received request.
Generally, selecting appropriate rules is burdened by a process of the decision engine called
the selecting rules process. As mentioned before, the request engine receives the request, which
serves as goal. Hence, the goal is specified and the request engine or selecting rules process
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specifically, must specifically find a way to achieve that specified goal. A backward-chaining
method accomplishes this. Indeed, there are two methods for achieving goals from many rules.
These methods are [94,95]:
● Forward chaining: forward chaining is an inference method that may be described as working
forward from data. Forward chaining starts with the given data and uses rules to extract more
data until a goal is reached. In this case, an inference engine searches the rules until it finds
one that meets the conditions. When such a rule is found, the engine concludes the
consequent, and adds recent rule to the set of collected rules. The name of forward chaining
comes from the fact that the interface engine starts with the data and reasons its way to the
answer. Because the data determines which rules are selected and used, this method is also
called data-driven [85].
● Backward chaining: backward chaining is an inference method that can be described as
working backward from the goal(s). Backward chaining starts with a goal or list of goals and
works backwards from the consequences to the antecedent to see if there are data available to
support any of these consequences. This inference engine searches the inference rules until it
finds one which has a consequent that matches a desired goal. If the antecedent (If clause) of
that rule is known to be true, it is added to the list of goals (in order for one's goal to be
confirmed, one must also provide data that confirm this new rule). Because the goal
determines which rules are selected and used, this method is further called goal-driven [86].
To achieve the result, the selecting rules process looks for the rules that gratify the
determined goal. Particularly, selecting rules process looks for the rules that can produce this
goal. If a rule is found and fired, selecting rules process takes one or all rules which completely
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or partially gratify the goal. Selecting rules process continues searching until there are no more
rules matched. Set of extracted rule may be defined as follows:
Set = {rulex | (∃ Ac ∋ rulex, ∃ nj ϵ Ac < (n1:v1),…, (nk,vk)> ⋀ ∀ Ac ∋ request,
∃ ni ϵ Ac < (n1: v1),…………., (nk; vk)> , If nj == ni Then vj == vi )}
If set of extracted rule is null, the next two steps will be skipped. This means that the request
is accepted.
Eventually, the request engine must extract one result from those selected rules and return
that as a final result.
Selecting Attribute
After choosing appropriate rules, and by knowing the format of every rule, determining who
are allowed to access or do a specific operation on the object under mentioned circumstances
(i.e. environment condition) is accomplished. By observing the format of a rule, the first item
represents one of the four pieces of information:
● Name of the subject or accessing user
● One or more attributes of subject or accessing user. These attributes may be used for
grouping the subject or accessing user. Each attribute appears with related value
● Adjacent user of the target user or the controlling user
● Trusted user of the target user or the controlling user
As defined previously, adjacent and trusted users may be determined as rules defined by a
target user, a controlling user, or the supervisor of the social network. In the proposed model,
supervisor is supposed to provide definition for both adjacent and trusted users.
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The selecting attributes process may generate two sets of rules. The first set includes rules
that fulfill the request, and the second set includes rules that do not meet the request. The
following list show how one or two sets are generated:
● Set 1: {rulex | (∃ ua ∋ rulex , ∃ nj ϵ ua < (n1:v1),…………., (nk,vk)> ⋀

∀ ua ∋ request, ∃ ni ϵ ua < (n1: v1),…………., (nk; vk)> , If nj == ni Then vj == vi ) ⋀
(∃ ec ∋ rulex, ∃ vt ϵ ec <time:vt>, vt == Current Time ⋀ ∃ vl ϵ ec <location:vl>, vl == Current
Location)}
● Set 2: {rulex | (∃ ua ∋ rulex , ∃ nj ϵ ua < (n1:v1),…………., (nk,vk)> ⋀

∀ ua ∋ request, ∃ ni ϵ ua < (n1: v1),…………., (nk: vk)> , If nj == ni ⋀ vj != vi ) ⋁
(∃ ec ∋ rulex , ∃ vt ϵ ec <time:vt>, vt != Current Time ⋁ ∃ vl ϵ ec <location:vl>, vl != Current
Location)}
Finally, two lists of rules can be generated. The first list includes one or more rules granting
permission to the accessing user and the second list includes one or more rules denying
permission to the accessing user. Either Set1 or Set2 may be null.
Note that the entire social network graph must be traversed in order to extract entities and
their attributes. Using functions introduced in chapter 6, the entities and related information can
be reached through the social network.
Deriving result
This process uses the lists generated by the previous process and concludes the result. If
either Set1 or Set2 includes rules, there is no conflict and deriving result process either accepts or
rejects the request in terms of which Set includes rule(s). Sometimes the rules defined by
controlling user conflicts with the rules defined by the supervisor of the social network. The
conflict is recognizable if both sets of rules include one or more rules. To resolve this issue, rules
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existing in the two lists need to be compared one by one correspondingly in terms of the criteria
addressed earlier in this chapter. This can be done using a process called fixing clashes. Fixing
clashes engine uses the following three criteria to resolve the conflict.
● The first criterion is the timestamp attached to each rule. As mentioned before, since the
transformation engine receives a policy and converts the policy into one or more rules, the
transformation engine attaches a timestamp to the recently added rule. This timestamp
represents the time when the rule is added to the social network.
● The second criterion defines rules, which override other rules. This can be defined by the
target user, the controlling user, or the supervisor.
● The third criterion comes from the policy metadata defined by the supervisor. This basically
determines who dominates who. In the proposed model, it is assumed that the supervisor
dominates other users on the social network.
Based on the above descriptions, this process chooses the most appropriate rule in terms of:
Appropriate rule = {rulei | (∀ rulei, rulej: rulei ϵ Uca, rulei ϵ Set1, rulej ϵ Ucb, rulej ϵ Set2)
If rulei.t > rulej.t ⋁ rulei overrides rulej ⋁ Uca dominates Ucb} ⋃ {rulej | (∀ rulei , rulej : rulei ϵ
Uca, rulei ϵ Set1 , rulej ϵ Ucb, rulej ϵ Set2 ) If rulej.t >= rulei.t ⋁ rulej overrides rulei ⋁ Ucb
dominates Uca }
Fixing clashes selects the rule of the first list and compares it to the corresponding rule of the
second list. Comparison may be done based on one or more criteria.
For simplicity, the proposed model is tuned for the first criterion so that Fixing clashes
process orders rules in ascending or descending order based on the timestamp and related
definition provided in the removing confrontation criteria table. Deriving result process looks at
the rule of the first list and compares it to the corresponding rule of the second list. Both rules
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have the equal position in these two lists. If fixing clashes process finds that conflicting rules
having the same timestamp, the fixing clashes process will use the second criterion. Again if this
process does not find any fact to choose the rule, this process uses the third criterion for
comparison. Fixing clashes process performs this step until between two compared rules, it
selects one, and consequently it removes the conflict. This means that in terms of the selected
rule, the request engine accepts or rejects the request. If fixing clashes reaches to the end of the
lists and does not find any rule, it cannot remove the conflict. Due to respecting to conservative
solution, the request will be rejected. Ultimately, the request engine is able to provide an answer
for a request.
3.9

Examples
In order to describe how the proposed model evaluates a request, several examples will be

presented and discussed in the following.
Example 1: Ben pokes Alice.
In this example Bob wants to poke Alice. Previously, Alice defined a policy like “only my
friends are allowed to poke me”. Transformation engine translates this policy into a rule, which
is an easy-to-use form and understandable by social network access control engine. To reach this
goal, transformation engine sends a policy to NLP, meanwhile the type of input is completely
clear for this process. Transformation engine’s result is a list of words with comprehensive
information. In order to prepare this list, NLP module uses tokenize process to split the given
sentence into constituent words. The following list denotes the tokenize process result.
<only, my, friends, are, allowed, to, poke, me>
Keyword recognition process, which is a process of NLP module, adds grammatical
information to every item in the list. This process uses a keyword table to find out parts of speech

93

for each word and word-entity table that maps words in a policy or in an inquiry into social
network entities. The result of this step may be expressed as follows:
(<only, (preposition, adjective, -)>, <my, (pronounce, subjective, -)>, <friends, (noun, plural, )>, <are, (verb, tobe, -)>, <allowed, (verb, main, -)>, <to, (preposition, second verb, -)>,
<poke, (verb, second verb, -)>, <me, (pronounce, objective, -)>)
When knowledge extraction receives a list, regarding the words’ parts of speech, knowledge
extraction collects words, which appear in the list sequentially and have related meaning, and
keeps them as an item in the new list. Hence, the result of the knowledge extraction process may
be expressed as the following:
{(t1,’0’), (<only, (subject, ∃, accessing user, -)>, <my friend, (subject, ∀, relationship, -)><are
able to poke, (action, poke, -)>, <me, (object, ∀, target user, -)>)
In this example, the type of input sentence is a policy. Therefore, transformation engine calls
rule maker to create a rule, which is converted form of a policy. The rule stored in the repository
managed by Alice may look like:
“< ∃ ua (∀ ua, Ac (relationship: friend+1), ∀ tu (name: _self)), Ac (action: poke), ∀ tu (name:
_self) >- t1”
When someone tries to poke Alice, one creates an inquiry to access Alice who is object and
target user specifically on the social network. Suppose there is an inquiry like “Ben wants to
poke Alice”. Like in the previous step, this inquiry must be changed into a simple format.
Transformation engine uses several processes and converts the inquiry to request. The request
may look like as the following:
“< ∃ ua (name: Ben), Ac (action: poke), ∃ tu (name: Alice)>”
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The social network site sends the inquiry to an object who is supposed to manage a given
action. In this example, the inquiry was created for accessing (i.e. poke) the object, which is a
target user whose name is Alice.
Request engine takes the request. First, selecting rules process must find all rules that are
defined by the target user or the supervisor, and meet all conditions or criteria in the request.
These selected rules must meet several criteria such as the following:
● Type of the action which is requested by the accessing user to perform an operation on an
object
●

Environment conditions, which are mentioned in the query by accessing user, identifies
conditions which have been fulfilled by given request. As mentioned earlier in this
document, these conditions are stored and managed by supervisor.

●

Adjacent users who have a specific relationship with the object under a certain distance,
have been defined in the received request. Adjacent users are defined either by an object, or
by a supervisor.

●

Trusted users who are in the circle of trustee of the object or subject, have been mentioned
in the given request. Trusted users are defined by either object, supervisor or both.
In this example selecting rules process returns only one rule, which is stored in Alice’s

repository. Regarding Alice’s rule, only her friends can poke her. It means that every user on the
social network site who has a direct friend relationship with Alice is allowed to poke her. Direct
relationship means the length or distance of relationship is one. In this example, the accessing
user is determined explicitly. In order to find out Alice’s friends, selecting attribute process
should search in terms of the requestor name. Due to existing merely one rule, selecting attribute
looks for the accessing user attribute of the rule. It is obvious if there are more rules, selecting
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attribute searches one or more attributes in terms of each rule. Afterwards, deriving result
process, the third process of the request engine, searches a user whose name is “Ben” and has a
relationship type as “friend” with “Alice”. In this example, deriving result process finds a user
whose name is “Ben” even though this user does not have a “friend” relationship with “Alice”, in
terms of Figure 9. So making result process returns nothing. Ultimately, the decision engine
rejects the request meaning that Ben is not allowed to poke Alice.
Example 2: None of my colleagues are allowed to be friend with my kids.
In this example Alice defines a policy on behalf of her kids. In the proposed method,
members of the social network are allowed to define policies on behalf of other members who
are part of adjacent or trusted group. A member for whom another member defined the policy is
allowed to accept or reject the policy. If this member accepts that policy, the policy will be
transformed into a rule and will be saved in their repository. The acceptance of the policy will
therefore affect the member’s response. Otherwise, the policy will be rejected. In this example,
Alice defines a policy like “none of my colleagues are allowed to be friend with my kids” and her
kids accept it. Like the previous example, Transformation engine translates this policy into a
rule. To reach this goal, NLP receives this policy. NLP module uses tokenize process to split the
given sentence into constituent words. The following list denotes the tokenize process result.
< none, of, my, colleagues, are, allowed, to, be, friend, with, my, kids >
Keyword recognition process adds grammatical information to every item of the list. This
process uses the keyword table to find out parts of speech for each word. Finally, the output of
keyword recognition process is a list as follows:
(<none, (preposition, adjective, ¬)>, <of, (preposition, adjective, -)>, <my, (pronounce,
subjective, -)>, <colleagues, (noun, plural, -)>, <are, (verb, tobe, -)>, <allowed, (verb, main, 96

)>, <to, (preposition, -, -)>, <be, (verb, tobe, -)>, <friend, (noun, singular, -)>, <with,
(preposition, -, -)>, <my, (adjective, possessive, -)>, <kids, (noun, plural, -)>)
After doing some processes by knowledge extraction, the result may be presented as the
following:
{(t1,’0’), (<none, (subject, ∃, accessing user, ¬)>, < my colleagues, (subject, ∀, relationship,
¬)>, < friend, (action, friend, -)>, <my kids, (object, ∀, target user, -)>)
In this example, the type of input sentence is a policy. Therefore, transformation engine calls
rule maker to create a rule, which is converted form of a policy. The rule stored in the repository
managed by Alice’s kids (i.e. Sue) may be formatted as follows:
“< (∄ ua (∀ ua, Ac (relationship: colleague+1), ∃ tu ( name:_self))), Ac (action: friend), ∃ tu
(name: Sue) >- t1”
Example 3: Alice says “my colleagues are allowed to edit my documents after office hours and at
weekends”
In this example Alice defines a policy to give permission to her colleagues for editing her
documents during certain time including after office hours and at weekends. Like the previous
example, Transformation engine translates this policy into rule. To reach this goal, NLP, a
process of transformation engine, receives this policy. Knowledge extraction’s result is a list of
words with its comprehensive information. In order to prepare this list, NLP module uses
tokenize process to split the given sentence into constituent words. The following list denotes the
tokenize process result.
<my, colleagues, are, allowed, to, edit, my, documents, after, office, hours, and, at, weekends >
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Keyword recognition process adds grammatical information to every item of the list. This
process uses a keyword table to find out parts of speech for each word. Finally, the output of
keyword recognition is a list as follows:
(<my, (adjective, possessive, -)>, <colleagues, (noun, plural, -)>, <are, (verb, tobe, -)>,
<allowed, (verb, main, -)>, <to, (preposition, -, -)>, <edit, (verb, , -)>, (<my, (adjective,
possessive, -)>, <documents, (noun, plural, -)>, <after, (preposition, adjective, -)>, <office,
(adverb, , -)>, <hours, (noun, plural, -)>, <and, (conjunction, -, -)>,<at, (preposition, -, -)>,
<weekends, (adverb, , -)>)
After doing some processes by knowledge extraction, the result may look as the following:
{(t1,’0’), (< my colleagues, (subject, ∀, relationship, -)>, < edit, (action, edit, -)>, <my
documents, (object, ∀, target recourse, -)>, < (time: work hour+, time: weekends)>)
In this example, the type of input sentence is a policy. Therefore, transformation engine calls
rule maker to create a rule, which is converted form of a policy. The rule stored in the repository
managed by Alice may follow a form as follows:
“< (∀ ua (∀ ua , Ac (relationship: colleague+1), ∃ tu (name:_self))), Ac (action: edit), ∀ tr (name:
document) ∃ uc (name:_self), Ec (time: >office hour, time: weekend)>- t1”
Example 4: Only my adjacent colleagues are allowed to read my documents.
In this example Alice defines a policy to give permission to her trusted colleagues to read her
documents. Like the previous example, Transformation engine translates this policy into the rule.
To reach this goal, transformation engine receives this policy and generates a list of words with
its comprehensive information. In order to prepare this list, NLP module uses tokenize process to
split the given sentence into including words. The following list denotes the tokenize process
result.
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< only, my, adjacent, colleagues, are, allowed, to, read, my, documents >
Keyword recognition process adds grammatical information to every item of the list. This
process uses the keyword table to find out parts of speech for each word. Finally, the output of
keyword recognition is a list as follows:
(<only, (preposition, adjective, -)>, <my, (adjective, possessive, -)>, <adjacent, (adjective, -, )>,<colleagues, (noun, plural, -)>, <are, (verb, tobe, -)>, <allowed, (verb, main, -)>, <to,
(preposition, -, -)>, <read, (verb, , -)>, (<my, (adjective, possessive, -)>, <documents, (noun,
plural, -)>)
After doing some process by knowledge extraction, the results may be as follows:
{(t1,’0’), (<only, (subject, ∃, trusted user, -)>, < my adjacent colleague, (subject, ∀, relationship,
-)>, < edit, (action, edit, -)>, <my documents, (object, ∀, target recourse, -)>)
In this example, the type of input sentence is policy, so transformation engine calls rule
maker for creating a rule which is converted form of policy. The rule stored in the repository
managed by Alice might be as following:
“< (∀ ua (∀ ua , Ac (relationship: colleague+1), ∃ tu (name:_self))), Ac (action: edit), ∀ tr (name:
document)>- t1”
Example 5: Alice wants to share her photo with users who share their photos with Alice.
Regarding this example, Alice defines a policy to keep her photos safe from unauthorized
access. She defines “someone whom I can access their photos, is allowed to access my photos”.
The transformation engine receives the policy. After tokenizing the input, it generates the
following list:
< someone, whom, I, can, access, their, photos, is, allowed, to, access, my, photos >
After running knowledge recognition, we have:
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(<someone, (pronoun-indefinitive, subject, -)>, <whom, (pronoun-relative, subject, -)>, <I,
(pronounce, subject, -)>, <can, (verb, auxiliary, -)>, <access, (verb, main, -)>, (<their,
(adjective, possessive, -)>, <photos, (noun-common, object, -)>, <is, (verb, tobe, -)>, <allowed,
(verb, main, -)>, <to, (preposition, -, -)>, <access, (verb, main, -)>, (<my, (adjective,
possessive, -)>, <photos, (noun-common, subject, -)>)
Knowledge extraction receives the list and generates a new list as follows:
{(t1,’0’), (<someone, (subject, ∃, accessing user, -)>, <whom, (subject, ∃, controlling user, -)>,
<I, (subject, ∃, accessing user, -)> <can access, (verb, main, -)>, <their photos, (object, target
recourse, ∀, -)>, < is allowed to access, (action, access, -)>, <my photos, (object, target
recourse, ∀, -)>)}
Finally, the rule might be shown like:
“< (∀ ua (∃ua (name: Alice), Ac (name: access), ∀ tr (name:photo) ∃ uc)), Ac (action: access), ∀
tr (name:photo) ∃ uc (name: _self)>- t1”
Example 6: Alice wants to tag Bob in her photo.
Regarding this inquiry, Bob defined a policy which is no one is allowed tagging me in its
documents. On the other hand, the supervisor defined a policy which mentions everyone is
allowed tagging someone in its document. The decision engine generates the query and the rules
corresponding to the inquiry and the policies defined by users. The following shows these
outputs:
Alice’s request: “< (∃ua (name: Alice), Ac (name: tag), ∃ tu (name: Bob) >- t3”
Bob’s rule: “< (∄ ua, Ac (name: tag), ∃ tu (name:_self)>- t2”
Supervisor’s rule: “< (∀ ua, Ac (action: tag), ∀ tu >- t1”
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When the request engine is given the request, the selecting rules process will be performed.
This process searches all rules stored in the repository of the supervisor and the repository of
Bob. Using the backward chaining mechanism, this process extracts rules and generates a list.
Each rule mentions about “Alice” in accessing user’s name or mentions “tag” as action, no
matter the rule accepts or rejects the request.
The selecting attributes is given the list. This process searches the attribute of entity
participated in the rules and the request and certifies which rule accepts the request and which
rule rejects the request. Based on this recognition, two lists will be generated. the first list
includes rules accepting the request and the next list includes all rules rejecting the request. So
list 1 consists one rule defined by the supervisor, and list 2 consist a rule defined by Bob.
The deriving results is given two lists. Using the rules contradiction table, this process
concludes the result. Based on the data saved in this table, this process uses timestamp to remove
the conflict. Compare to the supervisor’s rule timestamp, the Bob’s rule has been fed to the
social network recently, so the Bob’s rule will be credited. Hence, the request will be rejected
and Alice cannot tag Bob in her photo.
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4. Enterprise Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Model
4.1

Introduction
Online communication sites need to share their resources among themselves. A user of one

site should be able to access a resource of another site. Hence, under extend social networks
model, each social network site must secure their assets against an access request received from
other social network sites. The model defined in Chapter 3, consists of only one social network
site in which all requests are initiated and computed internally. This chapter concentrates on the
enterprise model that encompasses several social network sites, which wish to share their
resources.
Several assumptions in the enterprise model are offered in this chapter. Firstly, no entity of a
social network is allowed to define policies on behalf of another entity of another social network
in order to protect its associated resources, although this feature supports in the fundamental
model described in Chapter 3. Secondly, users from different social networks cannot be adjacent
or trusted user to others. This means that adjacent or trusteed user can be define within one social
network.
This chapter is considering how access control mechanism manages the entire enterprise
model. The access control mechanism, which depends upon the users’ requirements and
distribution of the resources, plays an important role in the success of the model. The
components of an access control mechanism may be separated and distributed within an
enterprise model and may be different from one social network to another.
This chapter investigates the access control requirements within the enterprise model. Each
social network site participating in this model has its own access control mechanism (i.e.
decision engine) which evaluates a given request and provides an appropriate response. This
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chapter describes a coordinator that is situated among all social network sites and is responsible
to route a request and corresponding response among participants. The response to a given
request is part of each social networks’ responsibility. This approach is an appropriate method to
manage the enterprise access control model in a dynamic way and is called Enterprise PolicyBased Attribute Access Control (EPBAAC).
4.2

Enterprise Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Model
EPBAAC represents the association of various social networks in which they wish to share

resources and information, not only within one social network but also among several social
networks. Regarding the NIST definition, “an enterprise is a collaboration or coalition among
several participants requiring them to share and manage their information” [10]. These
participants could be either social network sites or organizations. An enterprise model could be a
heterogeneous or homogeneous collection of either social network sites or organizations. Hence,
participants might have different or identical governing principles for sharing resources and
information. The EPBAAC model supports homogeneous participants. In other words, each
participant has its own identical governing principle. An enterprise model should have
appropriate management for efficient resource sharing, using of policies and attributes, and
forcing access control mechanism through the extended model.
Figure 17 presents a basic picture of the EPBAAC.

Figure 17- Enterprise Access Control Model
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In this model, two noticeable sections can be seen. The first section is the management
section, which presents enterprise supervision, and the second one creates the body of the
enterprise model and represents the gigantic part of this model. This part is a collection of
various independent participants, which might be either social network sites or organizations.
The following gives a brief description for each section:
•

The first section or management section is called enterprise supervision. At first glance, this
section is the administrator of the enterprise model and oversees all events happening on the
enterprise model. Briefly, the enterprise supervision receives a request from a participant
(sender), performs some process on the request, and finally delivers the request to the
particular participant (recipient). The enterprise supervision might use metadata to route
messages among social network sites. In fact, enterprise supervision is a bridge connecting
all participants. Later in this document, more explanation for the supervision responsibilities
in the enterprise model will be provided.

•

The other section is a set of social network sites. Every participant uses the PBAAC model to
enforce access control for the corresponding resources and information, as well as to manage
them. Chapter 3 provides the comprehensive definitions for the PBAAC model. Within the
enterprise model, each participant is required to determine one or more policies to manage
not only the internal requests (i.e. sent by a local user) but also the external requests (i.e. sent
by users from other participants). Social network sites contributing to the enterprise PBAAC
model are completely independent, and they have access to one another’s resources through
the enterprise supervision. Under our approach, there are two types of social networks.
Figure 18 shows these two types. The following list provides definitions for both.

104

o The source social network is the one that initiates an inquiry to access information or do
an operation on resources, which are governed either by the current or by another social
network.
o The destination social network is the one that receives a request generated by the source
social network.

Figure 18 – Source, Target in Enterprise PBAAC
Besides the two important sections, there are some relationships, which are established
between the enterprise supervision and other social network sites. These relationships identify
each social network as part of the enterprise system, and sending and receiving an access request
or a response by assistance of the enterprise supervisor. In the rest of this chapter, a complete
explanation of the enterprise model will be provided.
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4.3

Enterprise Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Model Components
Figure 19 shows the EPBAAC model.

Figure 19- EPBAAC Model Components
The following listed items explain components of the EPBAAC model.
•

Enterprise supervision includes several elements such as a supervisor and one or more
repositories for storing access control policies and metadata. Enterprise supervision is a
bridge among other social networking sites. Therefore, social networking sites can send a
request to or receive response from other social networks. Through the enterprise supervisor,
requests and responses travel through the social network sites as messages. A request could
be an access resource or a list of the names of attributes associated with the accessing user
who exists on the source social network. A response could be an answer to the request or a
list of the values of attributes associated with the accessing user who exists on the source
social network. Enterprise supervision is the administrator of the enterprise model and may
define various policies to govern all operations on the enterprise social networks. These
policies will be defined and covered as future work. An element of the enterprise supervision,
called enterprise supervisor, is responsible to guide the enterprise model. The enterprise
supervisor organizes all events, which happen across the enterprise scope. For instance, an
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event could be a request raised by an accessing user in the source social network site to
access a resource supervised by a target social network site. The supervisor of the enterprise
model, like the supervisor of each collaborated social network site, has one or more
attributes, which is called Enterprise Supervisor Attribute (ESPA); each attribute stores a part
of the enterprise supervisor’s information represented in Table 3, Chapter 3.
The enterprise supervisor is responsible for maintenance a large amount of data such as
metadata (e.g. social networks’ information) and environmental conditions.
The enterprise supervisor stores volatile data related to environmental conditions, which
accommodates information of location or time. The structure of this table is the same as the
structure mentioned in Table 15, Chapter 3. Developing environmental conditions controlled
by the enterprise supervisor is not supported in this research, and it may be part of future
work.
The enterprise supervision may have one or more repositories. One repository stores various
information related to every social networking site. Table 17 shows this information. The
enterprise supervisor is allowed to define which participant dominates other participants.
This data item is used when rules defined by social networks have conflicts. This item helps
choosing the rule determined by a social network, which has a higher priority to control the
accessing of the associated resources. In order to show this, the last column of the table stores
a priority number; a participant with smaller number is able to overshadow others with bigger
numbers. Based on Table 17, SNS1 dominates SNS2. Several participants may have the same
dominant value. In this case, the function, described in Chapter 3, uses another criterion for
defining who is able to overshadow others.
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Participants’ ID
SNS1
SNS2

Participants’ Name
Dominant Value
Social networking site1
1
Social networking site2
2
Table 17 - Participants’ Information

Policies defined by the enterprise supervisor are converted to rules and then rules are saved
into the repository owned and managed by the enterprise supervisor. The structure saving the
rule is the same as the structure for saving rules defined by the supervisor existing in the
PBAAC model in Chapter 3.
•

Social network sites or organizations are the main body of the EPBAAC model. In Chapter 3,
social network site architecture and its associated elements have been described thoroughly.
As the social network described in Chapter 3, all social networks in the enterprise model
have their own supervisor. Social networks contributing to the EPBAAC model are
completely independent, and as mentioned before they have access to one another’s
resources through the enterprise supervision.

•

Multiple connections exist between the enterprise supervision and every social network site.
Every connection has been assigned a relationship type such as “PartOf”. If a social network
site generates a request to access a resource supervised by another social network site (i.e.
target), the request must be routed to the enterprise supervision before received by the target
social network site.
In the enterprise model, all policies and inquiries are in natural language. Hence, we require

defining a process to transform policies to rules and inquiries to requests. By using the policy
language definition, the transformation process will be accomplished.
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4.4

Relationship Type Basic Notation
In the enterprise model, every social networking site has a set of relationship types, which

has been comprehensively described in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the enterprise model includes a
relationship type such as “PartOf” established between enterprise supervision and each social
networking site. This relationship type is neither symmetric nor transitive.
Similar to the fundamental PBAAC model described in Chapter 3, we require keeping
information for this relationship type. This information is called relationship metadata, and
stored under the enterprise supervision section. The structure storing relationship metadata is
identical to the structure storing relationship metadata described in the Chapter 3. The enterprise
supervisor is the owner of this relationship metadata.
4.5

Graph Model
As shown in Figure 17, the enterprise model is a combination of two types of graphs.

•

The first type is a connected graph. This graph shows the enterprise supervision including
one or more repositories and environment condition. The enterprise supervision is connected
to every collaborated social networking sites.

•

The second type is a disconnected graph, which is a set of many connected graphs such as
social networking sites or organizations. These social networking sites are completely
independent and disconnected from one another. Each social networking site is a directed
graph as explained in Chapter 3.
The graph of the enterprise model is a set of graphs, which has at least four items.
G= {EG, G1, G2, ……, Gn}, such that ∀ ⍺ ϵ G, ⍺ = <N, E, Ʃ, W>
∀ Gi ϵ G, Gj ϵ G: ∃ EG → Gi, EG → Gj, ∄ Gi → Gj
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•

N is union of a finite set of subjects (S) and a finite set of objects (O) in the system,
represented as nodes on the graph.

•

Ʃ is a finite set of relationship types, represented as labels for connections on the graph.

•

W is a number that is attached to a relationship connecting a subject to another subject. This
number shows the percentage of trust one user has in another user in a social network site.

•

E ⊆N × N × Ʃ × W denotes graph edges and might be a set of existing connections such as
subject→ subject, subject→object and object→object relationships.
Figure 20 represents a graph for the EPBAAC model. For developing the graph model, a

graph database management system may be used as ideal solution.

Figure 20 – Enterprise PBAAC Graph
4.6

Enterprise Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Method Description
Under the EPBAAC model section, like the fundamental PBAAC model, every element is

allowed to define policies to protect individual information and resources. Once an element
generates a policy, this policy is routed to the decision engine. The decision engine transforms a
policy into a rule. Afterwards, the rule will be stored in the repository associated with the
element generating the rule. This element is not allowed to determine a policy to protect
associated resources on behalf of another entity existing on other social networks.
110

Some elements, namely accessing users, may generate a request for accessing or doing an
operation on an object. In order to investigate how our approach processes a request, as
mentioned before, we identify two different types of architecture for the EPBAAC model. One
architecture describes a set of independent social networking sites, and the other describes the
enterprise supervision. Regarding these two architectures, the EPBAAC model includes two
types of operations:
•

The first set of operations is internal operations, which performs on a social network locally;
accomplishment of these operations is completely autonomous. This means that each social
networking site is responsible for processing the received internal request and then deriving a
result. The whole process is the same as the whole process explained in Chapter 3.

•

The other set of operations is external operations, which are generated by the other social
networks in the enterprise model. These operations are mainly accomplished by enterprise
supervision. In other words, when a request is generated by a specific social networking site,
it is delivered to the enterprise supervision. Since the basic information (i.e. metadata) of
every social network is stored in the repository of enterprise supervision, the enterprise
supervision compares the basic information to the received request in order to obtain the
address of the receiver, and then sends the request to the social networking site destination
(i.e. receiver). The enterprise supervision includes various items such as enterprise
supervisor (ESpUser), environment conditions (EEnvCond), and the repository (ERep) for
saving various metadata. So we have
∃ ERep ϵ ESN, ∃ ESpUser ϵ ESN:
ESpUser ----------:FullOwner----------> ERep
∃ EEnvCond ϵ ESN, ∃ ESpUser ϵ ESN:
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ESpUser ----------:ControlledBy---------> EEnvCond
Based upon having two sets of operations, there exists two groups of inquiries in our model as
follows:
•

Inquiry for accessing or running an operation on a local object

•

Inquiry for accessing or running an operation on a non-local object

The decision engine accommodated in each social network site distinguishes between these two
groups of inquiries. Chapter 3 thoroughly explained all required operations for the first group of
inquiries. The first group of inquiries will not be sent outside, but the second group will be sent
outside of the local social network.
The second group will be subject to the following processes:
•

A request is created by the transformation engine. The request is attached to the addresses of
the source social network and the address of the destination social network. Because no
social network in the enterprise model has information about another social network, the
source social network sends the request to the enterprise supervision. Earlier, we showed that
every social network existing in the enterprise model connects to the enterprise supervision
under the relationship type “PartOf”. Within an enterprise social network model (ESN), there
is an enterprise supervisor (ESpUser) and one or more social networking sites (SNS) which
are related to ESpUser as follows:
ESN = {SNS 1, SNS 2, ……., SNS n} ⋃ ESpUser, ∀ ⍺i ϵ { SNS 1, SNS 2, ……, SNS n} :
ESpUser -----:PartOf-----> ⍺i

•

The enterprise supervision processes the request; based on the addresses attached to the
source social networking site’s request, the enterprise supervision sends the request to the
particular destination social networking site. If a request wishes to access a resource of a
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destination social network site, which does not exist in the enterprise supervision repository,
this request will be rejected.
•

In the final step, the decision engine existing on the destination social networking site
receives the request. The request combines several items. The first item shows the original
request and the rest of the items represent the addresses of the source and destination social
networking site. The format of the request will be described under the decision engine
section. The decision engine collects all rules and attributes of entities, which contribute to
the request, and evaluates the request. Those rules may come from the target user, target
resource, local supervisor of the target social networking site. Besides, the decision engine
needs values of various attributes belonging to the local and external elements included in the
request. An external element is the accessing user who is a member of the source social
networking. The decision engine is also responsible to recognize contradictions between
rules and removes them. Chapter 3 described the method for fixing rules contradictions.

4.7

Decision Engine
The decision engine is the principal part of the proposed enterprise model and consists of two

major engines: the transformation engine and the request engine. Like the PBAAC, each social
network participating in the enterprise PBAAC has its own decision engine. Under the PBAAC
and the enterprise PBAAC models most functions defined in the decision engine are similar
except the request engine. The decision engine within the enterprise PBAAC model performs
various types of inquiries, which require adding some new functions in addition to the PBAAC
model. This section explains these new functions.
4.7.1

Transformation Engine
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The transformation engine receives policies, inquiries, and queries, converts polices into
rules, and inquiries into queries. This section describes the processes of receiving an inquiry or a
query.
If the transformed engine receives an inquiry, it generates a request, which is in a wellformed format. If this engine receives a request, this engine does not process this request and
send it to the request engine for further processing.
Due to have a robust transformation engine, this engine runs its task in two phases, listed as
follows:
•

First phase: the transformation engine receives an input, which has a subject, a verb, and an
object. The object may be either internal or external, defined as follows:
o Internal object: if an inquiry contains an object located in the current social network, the
object is an internal object. In this case, the subject (i.e. accessing user), the object (i.e.
target user or target resource), and the input (i.e. inquiry), which is generated by internal
subject and performed by the local decision engine are in the same social network.
o External object: if an inquiry consists an object located in another social network, so that
object is an external object. In this case, the social network where the requested object is
located is not the same as the social network where the requestor is located and inquiry
has been generated.
The input could be an internal inquiry or external inquiry. The following describes both.
o Internal inquiry is created by a subject (i.e. accessing user) located in a social network
where the inquiry will be initiated and accomplished. This inquiry is in natural language
format, so NLP process is called as described in Chapter 3 to convert the inquiry into the
well-formed format. This inquiry may hope to access either an internal or an external
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object. For both scenarios, a request will be generated and sent to the request engine
settled on the source or destination social network.
o External inquiry is received by a social network (i.e. destination social network) which is
different from a social network (i.e. source social network) where the original inquiry has
been generated. Because external inquiry is in well-formed format, so the transformation
engine will be skipped and the external inquiry, which it may be assumed as request will
be sent to the request engine settled on the destination social network.
In order to process the internal inquiries, this phase starts by calling Natural Language
Parsing (NLP) process, which addressed completely in Chapter 3. As mentioned previously,
NLP uses two process, namely tokenize and keyword recognition process. The output of the
tokenize and the keyword recognition process might be like the following:
<word1, word2, ……. , wordn >
< (<word1, (parts of speech1 (major), parts of speech1 (detail), negative or positive
meaning1)>, ……….. , <wordn, (parts of speechn (major), parts of speechn (detail), negative
or positive meaningn) >) >
Knowledge extraction process adds extra information to the list in addition to the same
process, which has been addressed comprehensively in Chapter 3. The list generated by the
knowledge extraction process in the enterprise model includes identification of either source
or destination or both social network. The following shows the format of the list generated by
knowledge extraction. The list includes several items such as the list of words and their
associate basic information, which provides remarkable knowledge for corresponding word
as follows:
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o First item T defines the date and time when the input is fed into system. It will be called
timestamp.
o Second item X defines type of the input, “0” for policy, “1” for inquiry, or “2’ presents
attributes list.
o Third item S defines source of the input, “0” represents internal input, or “1” represents
external input.
o Fourth and fifth items address source social network and destination social network.
o Last item is a list of several elements, one of each might be such as follows:
<word, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative or positive meaning)>
The following describes detailed information for every item of the list:
Word: it might be a token or concatenation of more tokens of the input sentence.
Entity type, based on the definition addressed previously in this document, this might
be subject, object, relationship type, action, or label.
Quantifier is a symbol and indicates the scope of a term or determines the quantity to
which it is attached. Two famous examples of quantifier might be “∀” that represents
“for all entities” or “∃” that represents “there exists an entity” [5].
Entity, based on the components of our model, which we defined earlier, this may be
accessing user, target user, target resource, relationship type, or action type.
Negative or positive meaning: this is a symbol. If the word carries negative meaning,
either explicitly or implicitly, symbol “¬ “will be used. Otherwise symbol “-“will be
used for showing positive meaning.
Subsequently, knowledge extraction process creates a list by collecting items described
above. Therefore, we have:
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{(T, X, S), (SourceName, DestinationName), (<word1, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative
or positive meaning)>, ……..……, <wordn, (entity type, quantifier, entity, negative or
positive meaning)>) }
To clarify the functionality of these processes, pursuing the following example would be
helpful. For instance, a sentence “A wants to poke B who is a member of social network site
2” generates an inquiry in social network site 1. The following shows the output of each
process:
Output of the tokenize process might be such as: < A, wants, to, poke, B, who, is, a, member,
of, social_ network_site2>
Output of the keyword recognition process might be such as: {(<A, (noun, subject, -)>,
<wants, (verb, main, -)>, <to, (preposition, -, -)>, <poke, (verb, main, -)>, <B, (noun,
object, -)>, <who, (pronoun, object, -)>, <is, (verb, auxiliary, -)>, <a, (determiner, object, )>, <member, (noun, object, -)>, <of, (preposition, object, -)>, <social_network_site2,
(noun, object, -) >)}.
Finally, output of knowledge extraction might be such as: {(t1,’1’, ’0’), (SNS1, SNS2), (<A,
(subject, ∀, accessing user, -)>, <wants to poke, (action, poke, -)>, <B, (object, ∃, target
user, -)>)}
•

Second phase: if the input is an internal inquiry, the request maker process receives a list of
words and related information extracted from inquiry input. Regarding the action existed in
the list, this process generates request under one of the following format.
o If the inquiry is doing an operation against target user’s individual information, the
request might be as follows:

117

{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …….,
(attribute_name2: attribute_value2)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ……., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier] environment_conditions (attribute_name1:
attribute_value1)[, ……., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)])]} - T - S, (Sname, Dname)
o If the input is doing an operation against controlling user’s resource, the request might be
as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …….,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_resource [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …….,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]) [quantifier] controlling_user [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ……., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier]
environment_conditions (attribute_name1: attribute_value1)[, ……., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)])]} - T – S, (Sname, Dname)
Besides, each entity is supposed to protect their information by defining policies, which are
transformed to rules and saved in the corresponding repository. Under the enterprise model,
rule must mention which user from which social network is allowed to have access to this
information. Rule maker generates a well-formed format for the rule. Target users and target
resources are allowed to save their rules into the rule repository. These rules will be used when
the target user or the target resource receives the inquiry.
The rule identifies access control for internal, external, or both accessing user. Based upon the
object, which could be a target user or a target resource included in the list, this step generates
a rule under one of the following formats.
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o If the policy is protecting target user’s individual information, the rule might be as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)), ([quantifier] target_user
[(attribute_name1:
[([quantifier]

attribute_value1),

…..,

environment_conditions

(attribute_namen:

[(attribute_name1:

attribute_valuen)]),

attribute_value1),

…..,

(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)])]}- T[, (Sname, Dname)]
o If the policy is protecting user’s resource, the rule might be as follows:
{([qualifier] accessing_user [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), (action (attribute_name: attribute_value)),
([quantifier] target_resource [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), …..,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)] [quantifier] controlling_user [(attribute_name1:
attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen: attribute_valuen)]), [([quantifier]
environment_conditions [(attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ….., (attribute_namen:
attribute_valuen)])]}- T[, (Sname, Dname)]
4.7.2

Request Engine

As shown in Figure 14, Chapter 3, a request engine receives a request and then makes a
decision whether or not to grant permission to an accessing user who may then access or run an
operation on an object. Two types of request exist:
•

Internal request: this request is generated by the decision engine located in the source
social network site and received by the same social network site. Internal request may
wish to access either an internal or an external object. Accessing to an internal object was
described in the PBAAC model, Chapter 3. By the assumption of accessing to external
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object, this request will be sent to the enterprise supervision to route to the destination
social network site.
•

External request: this request is generated by the decision engine located in the source
social network site and received by the decision engine located in the destination social
network site. The destination social network site extracts different sets of rules and
attributes associated to the accessing user who is a member of the source social network
site.

In the enterprise PBAAC model, there are two groups of rules.
•

The first group is associated with the target users or target resources to protect their
assets.

•

The second one is associated with the local supervisor located in each social network site,
which governs all local events.

A request, which accesses an external object, traverses a longer path than a request, which
accesses an internal object. The request may pass, be accepted, or may not pass, be rejected, by
several sets of rules: the enterprise supervisor, the destination supervisor located in the
destination social network site, and the destination object located in the target social network
site.
The transformation engine certifies that the request is in the well-formed format and passes it
to the request engine. The request engine collects all necessary parameters. These parameters
might come from the internal entity or the external entity. The main parameters are attributes of
the accessing user, the environmental condition, or the rules of the destination supervisor, and
resources. The request engine evaluates the request and then accepts or rejects the request. The
request engine consists three processes as follows:
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•

The first process or selecting rules process is responsible to choose appropriate rules from
large number of rules defined by entities contributing in accessing control evaluation. These
entities could be internal, external, or both.

•

The second process or selecting attributes is responsible to collect all required parameters
from entities, which might be internal, external, or both. Receiving a request, this process
recognizes required parameter.

•

The third process or deriving result is responsible to conclude result from collected
information. Moreover, in case of conflicts among rules, this process provides a solution as
well.
The three processes will be described in detail as follows:

Selecting rules
A target user or target resource has various rules, each of which confines access to that target
user or target resource in terms of the type of operation, environmental condition, target user’s
attributes, target resource’s attribute, and accessing user’s attribute (or a group of which the
accessing user is a member). The selecting rules process selects related rules from different sets
of rules. The two sets of rules could be as follows:
•

The first set of rules was defined by the target user or owner of the resource to protect that
target user or resource against illegal access.

•

The second one might be selected from a large number of rules defined by the local
supervisor existing on each social network site. These are defined as general rules to dictate
policy to control the resources for the entire social network site.
Generally, a process of the decision engine burdens the reasoning system, which is defined

for selecting appropriate rules. As we mentioned before, the request engine receives the request,
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which may be pretended as goal. This term is used in rule engine system. Hence, the goal is
specified and selecting rule process must find a way to achieve this specified goal. A backwardchaining system accomplishes this goal. This process was explained comprehensively in Chapter
3, so we do not explain it here. Finally, the selecting rule looks for the rules that match the
specified goal. Chapter 3 described how rules are selected.
Selecting attributes
This process provides a mechanism for searching attributes corresponding to the entity,
which participated in accessing control evaluation and could be internal or external entity. For
extracting internal entities, Chapter 3 provided a comprehensive explanation. If this process
requires more attributes of the external entity, this process generates a list of these attributes.
Through the enterprise supervision, this process sends the list to the particular social network
site, which has generated the request (i.e. source social network). This list may have the
following format:
{(-,2, -), (Sname, Dname), (subject, (attribute_name1: -), …………., (attribute_namen: -))}
In this list, Sname represents the social network site generating the list of required attributes,
and Dname represents the social network site hosting the specific entity and associated attributes.
The social network site hosting the entity and its attributes, extracts the data from the attributes
of the entity, updates the list (i.e. adding value for each attribute in the list) and through the
enterprise, supervision returns the list to the social network site, which has started this process.
{(-,2, -), (Sname, Dname), (subject, (attribute_name1: attribute_value1), ………….,
(attribute_namen: attribute_valuen))}
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In this list, Sname represents the social network site updating the list (or the social network
site generating the access request), and Dname represent the social network site generating the
list (or hosting the specific object, which is given the request).
Similar to the PBAAC model, after choosing appropriate rules provided by the selecting
rules process and by knowing the format of every rule, determining who are allowed to access or
doing the operation on the object under particular circumstances, (i.e. environment condition) is
accomplished. The detail information about this process will not be offered here, since the entire
process has been addressed in Chapter3. Defining adjacent user and trusted user is completely
out of the scope of the enterprise PBAAC model.
Ultimately, list of accessing user who are allowed to do operation on the object will be
created. Besides, the last item of list denotes the environment condition of the enterprise social
networking site. Environmental conditions as its name presents will be computed based on each
social network site conditions and the enterprise conditions which usually might been changed
time by time. Every social network site and enterprise model store the values of the
environmental conditions. Without any doubt, for extracting entities and their associated
attributes, we require to traverse the entire social network graph existing in the enterprise
PBAAC model and by using functions provided in attribute-base function specification section
we are able to extract the entities and related information.

Deriving result
Sometimes rules defined by controlling user clash with rules defined by the supervisor of the
social networking site or the supervisor of the enterprise model. To solve this issue, we require to
compare two sets of rules considering the criteria addressed in this chapter earlier. Solving issues
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is accomplished by a process which is called fixing clashes. Fixing clashes engine uses three
criteria to remove the conflict.
•

The first criterion is the timestamp, which has been explained in Chapter 3.

•

The second criterion defines rules, which overrides other rules.

•

The third criterion comes from the policy metadata defined by the supervisor and the
enterprise supervisor. This determines who dominates who. For instance, the supervisor of
the enterprise model dominates the supervisor of each social networking site and supervisor
of each social network site dominates other users on the social networking site. There is a
hierarchal model for defining who dominates others.
Fixing clashes process selects a rule of the first list and compares to corresponding rule of the

second list. Comparison may be achieved based on one or more criterion. This means if fixing
clashes process found several conflicting rules having the same timestamp, then fixing clashes
process uses the second or third criteria for comparison. For simplicity our model was tuned for
the first criteria, so Fixing clashes process sorts sets of rules in ascending order, and selects the
rule of the first list and compare to the corresponding rule of the second list. Fixing clashes
process performs this step until finds a rule that overrides another rule which means conflict will
be removed, or reaches at end of the lists and does not find any rule overrides others which
means conflict will not be removed. In former case, the selected rule is able to provide an
answer for the request which could be accepted or rejected. In the latter case, due to using
conservative approach, the request will be rejected.
4.8

Examples
In order to describe how the enterprise model evaluates a request, the following example

helps to denote all steps.
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Example 1: An enterprise model includes two social network sites, social network A and B. A
user “x” of social network B would like to read a document which is an asset under management
of social network A and belongs to the user “y”. The related inquiry might be like: “x wants to
read document1 belonging to y of social network A” The user “y” determined a policy that only
local user is allowed to access her resources. So it is expected that this inquiry will be rejected.
By pursuing the proposed method, output of each step would be as follows:
•

tokenize process : < x, wants, to, read, document1, of, y, on, social, network, A>

•

keyword recognition process: (<x, (noun- concrete, subject,-)>, <wants, (verb, main, -)>,
<to, (preposition, -, -)>, <read, (verb, , -)>, <document1, (noun, singular, -)>, <y, (nounconcrete, object,-)>, <A, (noun- concrete, object,-)>)

•

knowledge extraction process: {(t1,’1’, ’1’), (B, A), (<x, (subject, ∃, accessing user, -)>, <
read, (action, read, -)>, <document1, (object, ∃, target recourse, -)>, <y, (object, ∃,
controlling user, -)>)}

•

request maker process: < ∃ ua (name:y), Ac (action: read), ∃ tr (name: document1) >- (t1,
(“1”), (B, A)

•

request engine receives the request, because this request tries to access a resource located on
another social network, so the request is sent to enterprise supervision. Enterprise supervisor
searches in the repository, and then routs the request to the final destination.

•

Social network A receives the request and local request engine makes decision like what we
showed in chapter 3. Due to stored rule belongs to user y, this request will be rejected and
then send the result to social network B through enterprise supervision.
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5.

Evaluation

5.1

NIST Standard
In any given social network, the number of users might be significant, the number of

resources that must be protected might be in millions, and hence the number of access control
policies that need to be defined might be in billions. If only one permission is incorrectly
granted, a user will be given unsupervised access to information and resources which could
jeopardize the security of the entire given social network.
Presently, security of information is an indispensable responsibility for all media keeping and
sharing information with others. In practice, all applications employ access control methods to
protect their information. Access control identifies activities of legal users and governs every
attempt performed by these users to access a resource.
Access control systems are built upon three fundamental concepts: policies, models, and
mechanisms. Access control policies are the first crucial requirement that define a method for
managing access, and a user who is allowed to access information. Access control mechanisms
translate a user access request to a system defined format like the well-formed format, which was
defined early in this document. Access control models stand between policy and mechanism, and
describe the security properties of an access control system.
The quality of access control policies affects the level of the security generated for the social
network, so it is reasonable to define various metrics to evaluate the quality of access control
systems and verify the access control properties.
Hence, four categories of metrics are defined by NIST [91]:
•

Administration: defines cost, efficiency, and performance of an access control system.

126

•

Enforcement: defines mechanisms and algorithms used in access control systems to enforce
the embedded access control models and rules. These functions affect the access control’s
decision-making efficiency.

•

Performance: defines the efficiency of the access control system.

•

Support: defines the usability and portability of the system, although these are not essential.
Based on the definition provided by NIST [92], this chapter presents several metrics for

evaluating the fundamental or enterprise PBAAC methods which we use in our approach to
implement access control methods in a social network.
Hence, the following metrics are classified based upon the four categories mentioned above:
1. Ability to combine several related rules. The PBAAC decision engine is able to collect
different access control rules, consolidate similar rules and derive a result under the specified
condition. These rules can be defined by the controlling user, the target user, and the
supervisor of the social network.
2. Ability to combine access control models. Under our approach, two access control models
are combined, namely ABAC and PBAC models. By using the ABAC model, access
constraints will be defined for each entity, and by using PBAC, policies enforcing access to a
resource will be defined. Under our model, policies will be defined by controlling user, the
target user, or the supervisor of the social network.
3. Ability to enforce the least privilege principle. Our model includes an entity as supervisor
who is the administrator of the social network. The minimum privilege principle will be
provided by rules defined by the supervisor. Our model accepts new users with various
associated attributes. In order to access control mechanisms supporting the principle of the
minimum privileges, constraints are saved as the attributes of a user.
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4. Ability to resolve conflict rules. Rule conflicts appear when multiple access control rules are
involved granting and denying permission simultaneously. They provide different results in
terms of accepting or rejecting a demand to do an operation on an object. This means that
rules clash over granting a user’s access. To support conflict resolution, the decision engine
provides a solution for removing conflicts and chooses the rule which fulfils the given
request.
5. Ability to define rule-specific language. Every user is able to feed policies and inquiries in a
natural language. The decision engine uses a specific syntax and schema to represent policies
and inquiries which is much more efficient for disclosing information existing in them.
6. Ability to integrate or support identification and authentication of social networks. Under our
approach, the attributes of users can be presented as the identification of the users.
7. Ability to decrease response time for granting or rejecting an access request. The next section
of this chapter shows performance of the system based upon the response time of computing
a request and generating a result. In order to achieve this, we run the application for different
numbers of simple rules, different numbers of complex rules, and different numbers of
attributes associated to entities. This section provides the analysis of several scenarios using
different types of rules, the collecting results, and the drawing a graph.
8. Steps required for assigning and denying user capabilities into a social network. Under our
approach, users can be granted new capabilities by adding extra attributes associated to the
user or by defining new rules, which generally could be generated by the controlling user,
target user, or the supervisor of the social network. Furthermore, these capabilities could be
revoked by erasing the attributes or removing the rules from the social network.
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9. Steps required for assigning and denying object access control entries into a social network.
If an object is added to the social network, the owner of the object is allowed to define
multiple policies to govern that. Moreover, the supervisor can add one or more policies to its
repository to control the object. During the lifetime of the object, the owner of the object
might require creating new rule(s), erasing some old rules, or updating the existing rule(s).
10. Support for separation of duty. One of the most fundamental access control methods is to
protect information from unintended accesses. Some users are allowed to access an object
and some users are not. Users who are duty-related to the objects are able to access the
objects. This duty might be determined by the user’s attributes or the object’s policy. Our
approach supports both mechanisms for defining the user’s duty and how this duty can be
related to a specific object.
11. Number of relationships to create an access control policy. Under our approach, there might
exist several numbers of rules. Each rule includes the essential access control elements such
as subject, action, and object; this is a simple form of rule. Sometimes we need to define a
complex rule which does not fit the simple format. The complex rule includes a nested
logical phrase of essential elements. This means that each element, except action element,
can be a logical phrase. For instance, the subject might be a logical phrase including subject,
action, and object. Access control rules are built by converting the user’s policy. The
decision engine converts natural language to a logical expression. If a user defines a complex
policy, the rule will be complex as well.
5.2

Implementation
To validate our solution, the model was implemented based on various assumptions for two

social networks including different number of members, the first social network with 20
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members and the next with 50 members. The first assumption compares running time when the
resource owner has been given a request for access a particular resource. The resource owner
defined several rules having no-attribute, one, two, or five attributes to protect his resource. In
Figure 21 and Figure 22, linear graph shows result of running time for each set of rules, where
there are 20 and 50 members in the social network.

Figure 21 – Rules with/without Attributes for 20 Members in Social Network

Figure 22 – Rules with/without Attributes for 50 Members in Social Network
As can be seen from two graph, we have the best running time when no rules exist for the
particular resource. It can clearly be seen that when rules do not include any attribute, the
running time will be slightly increased. Compared to the previous case, the linear graph shows a
small increase if every rule includes only one attribute. Rules with two or five attributes need
extra running time, notably when the number of rules will be increased. This graph presents
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nearly rapid rise in case of having rules from fifteen to twenty. The following graphs compare
running time of different assumptions for two social networks. The following graphs show a
little increase where there are 50 members in the social network.

Figure 23 – Rules without Attribute for 20 vs. 50 Members

Figure 24 – Rules with One Attribute for 20 vs. 50 Members

Figure 25 – Rules with Two Attributes for 20 vs. 50 Members
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Figure 26 – Rules with Five Attributes for 20 vs. 50 Members
Figure 27 and Figure 28 show running time of the model with or without rules having
conflict, for 20 and 50 members. Interestingly, the running time for conflicting rules increases
sharply. This trend continues for up to twenty conflicting rules.

Figure 27 - Conflicting vs. Non-Conflicting Rules for 20 Members in the Social Network

Figure 28 - Conflicting vs. Non-Conflicting Rules for 50 Members in the Social Network
Figure 29 compares conflicting rules with non-conflicting rules for two social networks
having 20 and 50 members. This graph shows increase in the running time for conflicting rules.
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Figure 29 - Conflicting vs. Non-Conflicting Rules for 20 vs. 50 Members
Figure 30 and Figure 31 present running time when resource owner defines complex rules in
two social networks having 20 and 50 members. As shown before, running times are not affected
by the type of the rules (simple versus complex) for cases of one to five rules. For more number
of rules, there is a dramatic difference in running time between the two types of rules.
Specifically, running time increases sharply when there are 20 or more complex rules. Figure 32
gathers result derived from two social networks and shows in one graph.

Figure 30 – Simple vs. Complex Rules for 20 Members

Figure 31 – Simple vs. Complex Rules for 50 Members
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Figure 32 – Simple vs. Complex Rules for 20 vs. 50 Members
In summary, all graphs shown from Figures 21 to Figure 32 indicate that in order to have a
better running time, resource owner should define simple rules including minimum number of
attributes.
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6.

Policy-Based Attribute Access Control Functions and Algorithms

6.1

Functions
This section describes functions, which are used in our model particularly in the request

engine process for traversing the graph of the model and extracting required information from
the graph. The extracted information may be a specific user with attached attributes, a specific
group of users, a specific relationship type, a particular resource, a group of resources, or a set of
rules. The following describes these functions:
1) MemberOf: this function returns all users of the social network (SN). So this function will be
defined as follows:
MemberOf(SN) = ⋃ {user | user ϵ SN}.
For instance, user1, user2, … , and usern signed up into the social_network_site1 so they are
members of the social network site.
MemberOf (social_network_site1) = {user1, user2, …… usern}
2) Assets: this function returns all resources existing in a social network. So for a social network
site (SN), this function will be defined like:
Assets (SN) = ⋃ {resource | resource ϵ SN}.
Resources can be in various types like files, devices, and etc. There is no doubt that every
resource has an owner who defines access control policy for protecting that resource. So
access to a resource is accomplished under the resource owner’s supervision. A resource
owner is a subject and can be either a controlling user or a supervisor.
For instance, a set of assets existing in the social_network_site1 is reached as follows:
Assets (social_network_site1) = {res1, res2, ……, resn}
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3) BelongingTo: this function returns all resources belonging to a particular controlling user or
supervisor on the social network. As mentioned earlier, controlling users and supervisors can
have one or more resources and they are the only members of the social network site who are
allowed to supervise their resources. Hence, for a social network SN, a user (u) may have
several resources. The following represents the definition:
BelongingTo (SN,u) = ⋃ {resource | (resource € u) ⋃ (u ϵ MemberOf(SN)) ⋃ (resource ϵ
Assets (SN)) }
For instance, user1 shares associated resources such as book (book1), and photos (phot1) on
the social_network_site1, so BelongingTo returns all resources of user1:
BelongingTo (social_network_site1, user1) = {book1, phot1}.
4) ParticipantOf: this function returns all components in the enterprise model. Participants may
be either social network sites or organizations. Previously, we described that the information
of all participants are stored in the enterprise supervisor’s repository. So for the enterprise
model (ESN) consisting multiple social network sites such as SN1, SN2,……… SNn, this
function will be defined as follows:
ParticipantOf (ESN) = {SNi | SNi ϵ ESN}.
For instance, enterprise_PBAAC encompasses various social network sites such as
social_network_site1, social_network_site2, ……, social_network_siten so we have:
ParticipantOf(enterprise_PBAAC) = {social_network_site1, social_network_site2, ……,
social_network_siten}
5) RelationshipTypes: this function returns all relationship types among subjects (i.e. users)
existing on a social network. It is obvious this function does not return relations between
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users and their resources. Hence, for a social network site SN, this function will be defined as
follows:
RelationshipTypes (SN) = ⋃ {relationship | (relationship ϵ SN) ⋃ ((user⋃user) ⋃ (user ϵ
MemberOf(SN))) }.
For instance, if “friend” and “parent” are the only relationship types in the
social_network_site1, So:
RelationshipTypes (social_network_site1) = {“frnd”, “frnd ”, ”prnt “}
-1

6) OwnershipType: this function returns the type of connection between subject and associated
resources. Again controlling users and supervisors are subjects who have resources.
Therefore, for a controlling user u and his resource (r) on the social networking site SN, this
function is defined as follows:
OwnershipType (SN, u, r) = ⋃ {Ownership | (r € user) ⋃ (u ϵ MemberOf(SN)) ⋃ (r ϵ
Asset(SN)) ⋃ (u⋃r) ⋃ (Ownership ϵ SN) }.
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, three types of ownerships (e.g. FullOwner, PartialOwner,
and CollectedBy) are determined and it would be possible to define more in terms of
requirements. For instance, user1 shared the associated book (book1) on the
social_network_site1, and user1 owns the book1 fully, so this function is as follows:
OwnershipType (social_network_site1, user1, book1) = "FullOwner"
7) AllianceWith: this function returns relationship type between two particular entities. As
mentioned earlier connection can connect subjects, objects, and subject and object. So the
function will be defined as follows: if in social network site SN, u1 and u2 are connected by a
relationship type, it can be shown like:
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AllianceWith (SN, u1, u2) = ⋃ {relationship | (relationship ϵ RelationshipType(t)) ⋃ (u1⋃u2)
⋃ (u1 ϵ MemberOf(SN) ⋃ u2 ϵ MemberOf(SN)) }
For instance, if Alice is Bob’s friend, this function returns the relationship type between these
two entities as follows:
AllianceWith (social_network_site1, Alice, Bob) = {“frnd”, “frnd ”}
-1

8) ComposedOf: this function returns all resources which all together generate another resource.
As mentioned earlier, a resource may be composed of other simple resources. Hence, for a
social network SN, a resource (r) may include several simple resources like r1,r2, …., rk. The
following represents the definition:
ComposedOf (SN,r) = ⋃ {r | (r € u, r1 € u1 ,r2 € u2, …., rk € up ) ⋃ (u, u1 , u2, ….,up ϵ
MemberOf(SN)) ⋃ (r, r1,r2, …., rk ϵ Assets (SN)) ⋃ (r ∁ (r1,r2, …., rk)) }
For instance, a book (book1) includes several chapters, these chapters belong to different
users in the social_network_site1, so ComposedOf returns all chapters existing in book1:
ComposedOf (social_network_site1, book 1) = {chapt1, chapt2, chapt3, ….., chaptk }.
9) ResourceToResource: this function returns relationship type between an including resource
and an included resource. So the function will be defined as follows: if in a social network
site SN, a resource r includes several simple resources like r1,r2, …., rk, it can be shown like:
ResourceToResource (SN, r, ri) = ⋃ {relationship | (relationship ϵ RelationshipType(t)) ⋃
(r⋃ri) ⋃ (r,ri ϵ Asset(SN) ⋃ (r ∁ (ri)) 1<=i<=k) }
For instance, if “chapt1” is a part of “book 1” and has a connection as “Revaggregation” in the
social_network_site1, this function returns the relationship type between these two entities as
follows:
ResourceToResource (social_network_site1, book 1, chapt1) = {“Revaggregation”}
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10) Path_From__S_userToD_user: this function returns all paths between a source and a
destination user. One path includes identical relationship type and represents a list of users
existing in the path. Hence, for two users who S_user is a source user and D_user is
destination user and they are members of a social network, this function will be defined as
follows:
Path_From__S_userToD_user( S_user, D_user) = ⋃ {path | (path = ∑ relationshipi ϵ SN, ⋀
S_user⥤ user1 ⥤……….. ⥤ userj ⥤ D_user) ⋀ (S_user, D_user, userj ϵ MemberOf(SN)) ⋀
(relationshipi ϵ RelationshipTypes(SN)) 1<=i<=n, 1<=j<=m}.
11) Labels: this function returns all labels on the social network. Labels will be defined for
grouping entities in the social networking site. Labels' name must be started with "lbl". If
social network site SN has various labels such as l1, l2…… ln. So for all users and all
resources in the social network SN, we can define this function as follows:
Labels (SN) = ⋃ {l | ⋃ (⋃ (user ϵ MemberOf(SN)) ⋃ (user ϵ l )) ⋃ ⋃ (⋃ (resource € user)
⋃ (resource ϵ Asset(SN)) ⋃ (resource ϵ l )) }. For simplicity, a label is identified as an
attribute of an entity in our model.
For instance, if “person” is defined to classify many users and this label is the only one in the
social network site, so we have:
Label(social_network_site1) = {“person”}
12) GroupedBy: this function returns all entities grouped by a particular label. Under the social
network site SN, if label (l) groups users, the function will be defined as follows:
GroupedBy (SN, l) = {users | (user ϵ MemberOf(SN) ⋃ (l ϵ Label (SN)) }
If label lr groups resources, the function will be defined as follows:
GroupedBy(SN,lr) = ⋃ {resource | (resource ϵ Asset(SN)) ⋃ (lr ϵ Labels (SN)) }
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One entity can belong to more than one group or have several different labels. In this case,
this label must group only either subjects or objects. This means that a particular label cannot
be used for labeling a resource and a user simultaneously. For more clarification, in
social_network_site1, a label “person” has been defined to group many users such as user1,
user2, user3, user4. So the result of this function may be as follows:
GroupedBy (social_network_site1, "person") = {user1, user2, user3, user4}
If there is a label “document” for grouping multiple resources associated with different users
in this social network site, this means these resources grouped by label “document” can be
book1, phot1. So the function returns the resources grouped by "document" as follows:
GroupedBy (social_network_site1, "document") = {book1, phot1}
13) AssociateWith: this function returns all labels grouping a particular user or a particular
resource. If social network site SN has a member (u) who may be in one or more group
labeled by l1, l2, …... ln, so this function will be defined as follows:
AssociateWith (SN, u) = ⋃ {li | (li ϵ Labels(SN)) ⋃ (u ϵ GroupedBy (SN, li)), 1<=i<=n}
If social network SN has a resource r which may be in one or more group labeled by l1, l2,
…., ln, so this function will be defined as follows:
AssociateWith (SN, r) = ⋃ {li | (li ϵ Label(SN)) ⋃ (r ϵ GroupedBy (SN,li)) , 1<=i<=n }
For more clarification, in social_network_site1 there is a member such as Alice who is in two
groups such as “manager” and “employee”. So this function returns a list of groups of which
Alice is member:
AssociateWith(social_network_site1, "Alice") = {"manager", "employee"}
If social_network_site1 consists resource photo1 which is in a group “image” the function
returns the name of the group as follows:
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AssociateWith(social_network_site1, "photo1") = {"image"}
14) InquiryToRequest: Since the social network receives an inquiry for accessing to a particular
resource, this function will be performed. By performing several processes, which are part of
the transformation engine, this function converts an inquiry to a request.
15) RunRequest: this function receives a request and makes a decision about whether or not grant
permission to access a particular resource. This function implements the request engine.
16) RunInquiry: Since a user feeds an inquiry in social network to get access to a resource, this
function will be performed. This function calls InquiryToRequest to generate the query, and
RunRequest in order to either accept or reject the inquiry.
17) PolicyToRule: when a user defines a policy to govern associated resources, this function will
be performed. Running several processes, which are part of the transformation engine, this
function converts a policy to a rule and saves the rule into the repository associated with the
user who generates the policy.
18) AdjacentCompanion: this function checks whether a user is adjacent to a particular user or
not. By using Path_From__S_userToD_user, this function finds all paths between the source
user and the destination user, and then by considering the adjacent user definition, this
function reveals the destination user is either adjacent to the source user or not.
19) TrustworthyUser: this function determines whether a user is trustworthy by a particular user
or not. By using Path_From__S_userToD_user, this function finds all paths between the
source user and the destination user, and for each path, generates a result or value of
trustworthiness. The value of trustworthiness has been generated by multiplying weights
attached to each relation in the path. If the result meets the trusted user definition, then the
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destination user is a trustworthy user for the source user, otherwise the destination user is not
a trustworthy user for the source user.
20) GetAccessingUser: this function which is a part of the request engine, extracts accessing user
from the request.
21) GetTargetUser: this function which is a part of the request engine, extracts target user from
the request.
22) GetTargetResource: this function which is a part of the request engine, extracts target
resource from the request.
23) GetAction: this function which is a part of the request engine, extracts action from the
request.
24) RulesOf: this function returns rules stored in a particular entity’s repository. The entity may
be target user, target resource, or supervisor. Hence, for a social network site SN, a subject S,
an object O, and an entity y, we have:
RulesOf(SN,y) = ⋃ {rule | ⋃ y: ((y ϵ S) ⋃ (y ϵ O)) ⋃ (rules € y) }
For instance, user1 has several rules, namely rule1, rule2, rule3 on the social_network_site1, so
RulesOf returns rules as follows:
RulesOf (social_network_site1, user1) = {rule1, rule2, rule3}
25) RulesOfAction: this function returns rules that consider a specific action and are stored in an
entity’s repository. The entity may be a target user, a target resource, or the supervisor.
Hence, for a social network site SN, an entity y, a subject S, an object O, and an action a, we
have:
RulesOfAction (SN,y, a) = ⋃ {rule | ⋃ y: ((y ϵ S) ⋃ (y ϵ O)) ⋃ (rule € y) ⋃ (a ⊗ rule)}
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26) RulesOfEnvironmentCondition: this function returns rules that consider a specific
environmental condition and are stored in an entity’s repository. The entity may be the
supervisor. Hence, for a social network site SN, an entity y, and an environment condition ec,
we have:
RulesOfEnvironmentCondition (SN, y, ec) = ⋃ {rule | ⋃ y: (rule € y) ⋃ (ec ϵ rule)}
27) AttributesOf: this function empowers us access to all attributes associated with a particular
entity on a social networking site. As mentioned earlier, supervisor, accessing users,
controlling users, target users, target resources, relationships, environmental condition, and
actions are allowed to have attributes. Hence, for a social network site SN, a subject S, an
object O, a relationship R, an action A, an environmental condition E, and an entity y, we
have:
AttributesOf(SN,y) = ⋃ {(attributeName:attributeValue) | ⋃ y: ((y ϵ S) ⋃ (y ϵ O) ⋃ (y ϵ R)
⋃ (y ϵ A) ⋃ (y ϵ E)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(S)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(O)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(R)) ⋃
(attribute ϵ Attr(A)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(E)) }
For instance, user1 has several attributes such as userID, name, and age in the
social_network_site1, so AttributesOf returns as follows:
AttributesOf (social_network_site1, user1) = {(userID:value1), (name:value2), (age:value3)}.
28) ValueOfAttribute: this function provides access to the value of the specific attribute
associated with a particular entity in the social network site. Entities, namely accessing users,
controlling users, target users, target resources, relationships, environment condition, and
actions are allowed to have attributes. Hence, for a social network site SN, an entity y, a
subject S, an object O, a relationship R, an action A, an environmental condition E, and an
attribute a we have:
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ValueOfAttribute(SN,y,a) = {attributeValue | (⋃attributeValue ϵ (attributeName:-)) ⋃ (⋃ y:
((y ϵ S) ⋃ (y ϵ O) ⋃ (y ϵ R) ⋃ (y ϵ A) ⋃ (y ϵ E))) ⋃ ((attribute ϵ Attr(S)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ
Attr(O)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(R)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(A)) ⋃ (attribute ϵ Attr(E))) }
For instance, user1 has an attribute attr1 such as userID in the social_network_site1, so
ValueOfAttribute returns a list as follows:
ValueOfAttribute (social_network_site1, user1, attr1) = {userID: ‘user 001’}.
29) RemoveRuleClashes: this function collects all rules, which conflict, and based on the policy
defined in the removing confrontation table, chooses one or more criteria. Based on the
criteria, this function compares the rules and then selects one of them, which fulfills the
request. For simulation, in order to remove conflicted rules, timestamp was chosen.
Algorithm result_inference provides a comprehensive description.
6.2

Algorithms
This section presents algorithms, which have been defined as analyzing the proposed model.

Decision engine
Decision engine is the main process of our approach. After receiving an input which may be
a policy or an inquiry, decision engine converts the input into a simpler format by running the
transformation engine process. If the input is a policy, the converted format will be a rule which
will be stored in the repository associated with an entity generating the policy. If the input is an
inquiry, the converted format will be a request and will be sent to request engine for either
accepting or rejecting.
Algorithm Decision_engine
Input: S: sentence
Output: answer: answer may be either “accepted” or “rejected”
1) Call transformation_engine
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2) Call request_engine
3) Return answer
Transformation Engine
Transformation engine process receives a sentence which may be a policy or an inquiry. The
goal of defining this engine is converting input, which is a sentence in natural language, into a
format which is more recognizable and understandable by the rest of processes. Transformation
engine runs several processes.
The first step of this process creates a list of words in the input. Each word has been attached
to some grammatical points.
The next step defines a simple format to present the critical information encompassed in the
input. After performing various functions mentioned in this algorithm, the input is transformed to
the simpler format. This format looks like (subject, action, object, condition). A policy will be
converted to a rule and an inquiry will be converted to a request. The rule is saved on the
repository of the initiator or repository of the resource associated with the initiator. The request is
sent to the request engine for further processing.
Algorithm transformation_engine
Input: S: sentence
Output: Rule, Request: these are a list of subject, action, object, and conditions
1) Call NLP
2) Call knowledge_extraction
3) If input is policy
3.1) Call Rule_maker
3.2) Store Rule on the repository
4) Else
4.1) call Request_maker
4.2) return Request
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Natural Language Process
NLP algorithm runs keyword_determination and keyword_recognition to generate a set. Each
item of the set presents a list including a word of the sentence S, and grammatical information
related to the word.
Algorithm NLP
Input

S: sentence

Output

W_info: list of elements in S, followed by parts of speech to each element

1) Call keyword_determination (input: sentence S, output: list of words existing in S W_list)
2) Call keyword_recognition (input: a list of words included in the sentence W_list, output:
list of elements in W_list, followed by parts of speech to each element W_info)
3) Return W_info
Keyword Determination Process
Keyword_determination extracts words from input, generates a list from these words. If
sentence S includes w1,w2,….., wn, so the format of output or W_list may look like: < w1,w2,…..,
w n>
Algorithm keyword_determination
Input

S: sentence

Output

W_list: list of words in S

1) Read a word from S, store into w
2) Do loop until w is not End-of-Line {
2.1) add w to W_list, separating with comma
2.2) read a word from S, store into w}
3) Return W_list
Keyword Recognition Process
Keyword_recognition attaches grammatical points to the word of the list, and creates a list of
words accompanied by parts of speech. There is a table, which has been stored on the supervisor
repository, describing syntactic and semantic features for a word. Each word will be attached two
grammatical definitions, major and minor parts of speech. The major parts of speech in English
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are noun, pronoun, verb, adverb, adjective, determiner, preposition, conjunction, article, and
interjection. The minor parts of speech may describe the detail of major parts of speech: Noun
may be abstract, collective, common, and concrete. Pronoun may be possessive, objective,
subjective, reflexive, intensive, demonstrative, interrogative, and indefinitive. Adjectives may be
possessive. Verb can be auxiliary and main. Moreover, knowing basic grammatical terms such as
subject, object, and action helps to understand some of the principle words in the sentence.
Hence, this algorithm looks for words in the table and finds corresponding parts of speech, major
and minor. In addition, identifying negative and positive meaning for each word, helps us to
determine that this sentence will refuse or accept a request. Generally, all words have been
ordered in terms of basic grammatical terms. This means that each item of the list starts with a
subject, followed by an action and finally ended with an object of the sentence and perhaps one
or more conditions. Providing keyword_recognition receives W_list as input, the output or
W_new looks like:
{< w1,(parts of speech(major), parts of speech(minor), neg/pos meaning)>, <w2, (parts of
speech(major), parts of speech(minor), neg/pos meaning)>, ….., <wn, (parts of speech(major),
parts of speech(minor), neg/pos meaning)> }
Algorithm keyword_recognition
Input

W_list: a list of words included in the sentence

Output

W_info: list of elements in W_list, followed by parts of speech to each element

1) Read an element from W_list, store into w
2) Do loop until w is not End-of-List
2.1) look up w in keyword table
2.1.1) If found: fetch parts of speech (e.g. principle, major, minor, neg/pos
meaning), and attached to the word. Afterwards, add to the W_info as an element of the
list
2.1.2) Else: Error “wrong keyword”
3) Endloop
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4) Return W_info
Knowledge Extraction
Knowledge extraction process uses the list generated by NLP process and consolidates some
elements of the list in order to generate a short and simple formatted list. Due to the order of
presenting elements on the list which is based on the principle grammatical terms of each word,
this process retrieves elements. Some elements placed side by side provides a common concept.
As a matter of fact, they complement one another. Hence, the knowledge extraction process
distinguishes these elements and integrates them. The knowledge extraction process compares
the parts of speech of elements. If both elements are subject, object, or action, then the process
compares the major information of parts of speech. Some elements such as preposition may be
deleted. Others like determiner may be used to distinguish that element is either singular or
plural. If one element presents an auxiliary verb and the next one presents the main verb, the first
element may be purged. Because this process uses natural language processing concepts to
generate the final list and it is out of the scope of this research, we don’t provide detail
explanation of this process. Occasionally, subject or object carries one or more conditions. These
conditions may be recognized by relative pronouns like who or whom in the original sentence. In
this case the condition part will be added to the element defined as subject or object. Finally, the
final list format looks like:
{(T,X), < w1,(entity type, ∀ / ∃ / ⋃/ - , entity, neg/pos meaning): condition>, <w2, (entity
type, - , entity, neg/pos meaning)>, ….., <wn, (entity type, ∀ / ∃ / ⋃/ -, entity, neg/pos meaning):
condition> }
Conditions have the following format:
(EnvCon: (time: date&time, cond:value))
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Algorithm knowledge_extraction
Input: W_info: list of words and grammatical terms attached to each word.
Output: W_final: list of critical words and related grammatical terms
1) Read elements from W_info
2) Purge some elements like prepositions
3) Group elements which have been correlated based on the principle grammatical terms
and parts of speech, and select the element conveying the most valued information.
4) Collect metadata of correlated elements and choose the most appropriate metadata for the
selected element
5) Replace subject with accessing user, or controlling user
6) If there are auxiliary verb and main verb, delete the auxiliary verb. Replace verb with
action attached metadata to the selected element and store as one element.
7) Replace object with target user or target resource
8) Replace determiner with quantifier symbol like ∀ and ∃
9) Attach metadata information to the selected element and add to final list
Rule Maker
Rule maker process uses a predefined format to generate a rule. A rule may have the
following format:
{< ∀ / ∃ / ⋃/ - Ua [(att:value) … (att:value)] >, <action, [(att:valur), …… (att:value)] >, …..,
< ∀ / ∃ / ⋃/ - Tu/Tr [(att:value) … (att:value)] ∀ / ∃ / ⋃/ - UC [(att:value) … (att:value)] >,
[<environment condition: (att:value) [(att:value), ….., (att:value)] ] }
Algorithm rule_maker
Input: W_final: list of critical words and related grammatical terms
Output: Rule: list of subject, action and object
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Read elements from W_info
Replace accessing user with Ua, and controlling user with Uc
Replace target user with Tu, and target resource with Tr
Rewrite elements with particular format
Return Rule
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Request Maker
Request maker process uses a predefined format to generate a request.
Algorithm request_maker
Input: W_final: list of critical words and related grammatical terms
Output: Rule: list of subject, action and object
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Read elements from W_info
Replace accessing user with Ua and controlling user with Uc
Replace target user with Tu and target resource with Tr
Rewrite elements with particular format
Return Request

Request engine
Receiving request, request engine calls several processes to collect all rules in the social
network site, find the one, which fulfills the request perfectly, and ultimately either accept or
deny the request.
Algorithm request_engine
Input: Request: a formatted request
Output: answer: a sequence of character that may be “accepted” or “rejected”
1)
2)
3)
4)

Call selecting_rules
Call selecting_attributes
Call deriving_result
Return answer

Selecting Rules
This process collects rules from several repositories. Some rules are extracted from the
repository of the target user or target resource. Target user and target resource are included in the
request. Some rules are extracted from the repository associated with the supervisor. These
selected rules must be related to the action mentioned in the request. Moreover, if the request
includes environmental conditions, these rules must meet that condition also.
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Algorithm selecting_rules
Input: Request: a formatted request
Output: rules: set of rules, UA: accessing user
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

8)

Read Request
Extract target user or target resource
Extract action
Extract accessing user
Read all rules stored in the repository associated to target user or target resource
Select rules which are related to the specific action and environmental condition meets
the current condition of social network environment
Read all rules which are defined by supervisor and provided to protect the specific
target resource or target user in terms of the specific action and particular
environmental condition
Return rules, UA

Selecting Attributes
After passing rules collected by the selecting rules process into the selecting attributes
process, selecting attributes searches attributes associated with the accessing user of rules and
attributes associated with the accessing user of the request. Accessing users’ properties
mentioned in the rules may provide value for a name, relationship type, or label. In this case,
selection attributes process determines that the accessing user in the request has a particular
relationship with the target user or controlling user, or the accessing user in the request is a
member of the label mentioned in the rules or not.
Algorithm selecting_attributes
Input: rules: set of rules, UA: user initiated an inquiry
Output: yesrules: set of rules supported the request, norules: set of rules rejected the request
1) Extract attributes of UA
2) Loop read item from rules {
2.1) Extract accessing user from rules
2.2) Extract properties of accessing user from rules
2.3) Extract attributes of accessing user from rules
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2.4)

If UA.attributes = access user. Attributes under the defined environment
condition
2.4.1)
yesrules.add(rules)
2.5) Else
2.5.1)
norules.add(rules) }
3) Return yesrules
4) Return norules

Deriving Results
The main responsibility of result inference is accomplishing the final answer to a request
generated by an accessing user. This answer may accept or reject the inquiry. In order to achieve
the result, value of the two received lists (e.g. yesrules, norules) must be checked. The social
network site will not able to provide a subtle answer, if two lists are empty. If one list has value
the other does not, the answer could be accepted or rejected. Otherwise, there are several rules
which are not collaborated and are not able to derive a unique result. In this case, the algorithm
must be able to define a solution in order to generate a unique result. The algorithm would sort
the two received lists in terms of the time when the inquiry has been fed into social network site.
The items of both lists are sorted in a descending way. The first item of the two lists will be
compared. This means that recently added inquiry has the most priority for making a final result.
Hence, the algorithm chooses the greater time. If the time is equal, the algorithm checks which
rule dominates another rule. If the rule is chosen from yesrules, this means the rule from yesrules
dominates the rule extracted from norules. So the accessing user has given permission to run the
action against the resource which has been requested. Otherwise, the accessing user is not able to
do the particular action.
Algorithm deriving_result
Input: yesrules: set of rules, norules: set of rules
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Output: Answer: a sequence of character that may be “accepted” or “rejected”
1) If yesrules is empty and norules is empty {
1.1) print “social network site is not able to make decision precisely, so the request
will be rejected”
1.2) Return answer = ‘rejected’}
2) If yesrules is not empty and norules is empty
2.1) Return answer = ‘accepted’
3) Else if yesrules is empty and norules is not empty
3.1) Return answer = ‘accepted’
4) Sort yesrules descending in terms of time when the rules have been inserted into
social network site.
5) Select the rules from yesrules which were the most recently added to the social
network site
6) Sort norules descending in terms of time when the rules have been inserted into social
network site.
7) Select the rules from norules which were the most recently added to the social
network site
8) Loop read (yesrules) is not End_of_list and read (norules) is not End_of_list {
8.1) If yesrules.Time > norules. Time
answer = ‘accepted’
8.2) Else if yesrules.Time < norules.Time
answer = ‘rejected’
8.3) Else if yesrules dominates norules
answer = ‘accepted’
8.4) Else if norules dominates yesrules
answer = ‘rejected’ }
9) If answer != ‘rejected’ and answer != ‘accepted’{
9.1) print “social network site is not able to make decision precisely, so the request
will be rejected”
9.2) answer = ‘rejected’}
10)Return answer
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7.

Conclusions and Future Works

Conclusion
This work presents a new information security model to secure access to a resource or
individual data in a social network, from unauthorized users. This model, which is the PBAAC,
encompasses the ABAC model and the PBAC model. The PBAAC model enforces effective
access control in a single and distributed environment.
As mentioned before, the PBAAC fundamental model includes either one social network site
or one organization, and the PBAAC enterprise model (or distributed) includes either several
diverse social network sites or organizations. Under both environments, users might have various
resources and wish to share them with other legal users but not illegal users.
In the PBAAC method, every user can secure belongings by generating several policies in
natural language. Furthermore, users who intend to access or do an operation on a resource are
able to generate the inquiry in natural language. By defining policies or inquiries in natural
language, users are able to determine guidelines for controlling belongings in an efficient way,
and requestors are able to describe requirements with more clarification as well.
The PBAAC method offers a well-formed expression for storing policies and inquiries in the
social network. After receiving policies or inquiries, the PBAAC method converts them into a
new format. A policy is transformed to a rule and stored on the repository associated with a user
who created the policy. An inquiry is transformed to a query, which will be evaluated by the
proposed method.
Under this method, users are responsible to preserve their resources that could have one or
several different parts. Because a simple resource has only one owner, determining access
control to a simple resource is accomplished by a set of rules defined by only that owner. While
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for a composed resource, enforcing access control is accomplished by several sets of rules; each
set of rules is defined by the owner of a particular part of the composed resource, and each set of
rules determines access to a part of the resource. This feature gives users the power to manage
resources in a highly secure way.
Also, a requestor is able to feed an inquiry into a social network by using natural language.
Using natural language provides users more flexibility and empowers users to protect assets in a
remarkably secure way.
A social network site or organization is governed by a super user who defines general
policies to enforce access control to all assets and resources existing in the environment. Hence,
under the PBAAC method, there are two classes of rules, the first is defined by ordinary users
and the second is defined by the super user, although it is assumed that a super user is able to
determine who is able to dominate others, and which rule overrides other rules.
When a request is generated to access or do an operation on a particular object, the request
will be evaluated, and then will be either accepted or rejected by using the access control
decision engine. The access control decision engine needs to collect several rules, several
attributes and environment condition. The several rules are defined to enforce access control of
the resource. The several attributes are attached to entities participating in the rules and query.
Afterwards, the access control decision engine evaluates them and derives a result. If the access
control decision engine finds conflicts among rules, it requires choosing one, which fulfills the
query perfectly.
The enterprise environment is designed for a homogeneous collection of social network sites.
In addition to the collection of social network sites, this model includes a supervision section to
make connections between other social network sites. The PBAAC provides an effective way for
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sharing resources and enforcing access control, and it employs several independent graphs. The
supervision graph collaborates with the other graphs, each of which is a social network.
The PBAAC model utilizes rules and attributes to accept or reject a request. This model is a
compromise among having more basic rules including one attribute, fewer basic rules including
several attributes, and nested rules with or without attributes. The basic rule with one attribute
means that a rule addresses the entity directly by using the name of that entity. The basic rule
with several attributes means that a rule addresses the entity by using several attributes of that
entity.
The nested rule means that a basic rule may contain a subject which itself is a basic rule, or an
object which itself is a basic rule, or both simultaneously. The nesting of the subjects and
objects can continue indefinitely. The higher the number of basic rules, the better the
performance of the proposed model.
This PBAAC model or its subtypes, the fundamental model and the enterprise model, make
the following contributions:
•

encompasses of the ABAC model and the PBAC model, enables users to define various
policies to govern their resources and to feed inquiries to social network in order to access or
perform an operation on a resource in the most effective way.

•

enforces finer-grained access control in the basic and the enterprise social networks.
o The basic or fundamental model, which is designed for one social network, shares
resources and enforces access control. This model uses a specific data model, which captures
data from a directed graph format. This format allows an efficient way to extract information
through a graph search.
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o The distributed or enterprise model, which is designed for a homogeneous collection of
social network sites, includes a supervision to make a connection between other social
network sites. Having an effective way for sharing resources and enforcing access control,
this model employs several independent graphs in which one graph connects to the other
graphs by the supervision graph.
•

utilizes a language specification convertor to transform a policy or an inquiry to a wellformed expression. This expression follows the format (subject, action, object, condition) to
present a rule or a request. By this definition, rules accept nested expressions, which means
the subject and the object could be a well-formed expression, as well.

•

offers a technique to enforce access control to an object when it is composed of other objects.
Each composing object has its own rules to manage the access.

•

determines a solution providing several rules that meet a received request, but all determined
rules cannot exist together and not all are true together. The proposed model uses three
criteria to choose a rule which fulfills the request perfectly.

•

uses rules and attributes to accept or reject a request. Data analysis proves that higher
numbers of basic rules improve or speed up the performance of the system.

Future works
As a future plan, the aforementioned model should be extended to cover several cases as listed:
•

Define access user as a non-person, so the proposed model is able to utilize a social network
and the non-person generates an inquiry on behalf of a person.

•

The supervisor generates an inquiry to access an object. Occasionally, the supervisor should
be able to generate various inquiries to ensure that the information security implemented for
a social network blocks all unmanaged requests.
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•

Under the enterprise model, the supervisor should be able to define policies to manage all
inquiries.

•

Store all resources under one umbrella in the enterprise model. By implementing this feature,
we hope the performance of social networks will be improved. Moreover, saving all users’
rules and all supervisors’ rules in one location decreases the time of graph traversal in order
to reach the goal.

•

Requesters should not be forced to be registered in the social network. Since the attributes
belonging to the requester meet the criteria for achieving entry, access will be granted. This
approach is definitely useful for social networks wherein resource owners wish unregistered
users to be able to have access if they have attributes that meet certain criteria. This method
empowers social networks to be free to have a predefined list of users who are approved for
accessing resources; this is critical for enterprise social networks where people might join or
leave the social network arbitrarily.
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